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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem description
The increased availability of GPS-enabled mobile devices that provide ac-
cess to Internet services has caused an incredible proliferation of new mobile
services that offer personalized information to users depending on their lo-
cation, called location-based services (LBS). In parallel, social network (SN)
services have become very popular among Internet users. As SN services are
almost entirely based on user-generated content, SN companies have focused
on providing easy access to their services, as well as new ways for the users
to generate information. We called geo-social networks (GeoSNs) those SN
in which the geographical positions of participants and of relevant resources
are used to enable new information services.
In most SNs, each user has a contact list of friends, also called buddies.
A basic service in GeoSNs is the proximity service that alerts the user when
any of her buddies is in the vicinity, possibly enacting other activities like
visualizing the buddy’s position on a map, or activating a communication
session with the buddy. Such proximity services are already available as
part of GeoSNs (e.g., Brightkite1), as part of a suite of map and navigation
services (e.g., Google Latitude2), or as an independent service that can be
1http://brightkite.com
2http://www.google.com/latitude
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integrated with social networks (e.g., Loopt3).
From a data management point of view, a proximity service involves
the computation of a range query over a set of moving entities issued by a
moving user, where the range is a distance threshold value decided by the
user. All existing services are based on a centralized architecture in which
location updates, issued from mobile devices, are acquired by the SP, and
proximity is computed based on the acquired locations.
While proximity services are very attractive for many SN users, they
also raise severe privacy concerns: a) the users may not fully trust the
service provider that will handle their location data, b) the users would
like to have better control on the precision of location data released to
their buddies. For the purpose of alleviating these concerns, we address the
problem of protecting users’ location privacy in the context of proximity
services, considering different possible adversaries, including the SP and, to
a different extent, the buddies.
Existing proximity services do not offer any protection regarding point
a) above other than legal privacy policy statements, and they offer a very
limited control regarding point b); for example, some solutions allow the
user to limit the location released to the buddies to the precision level of
city.
1.2 Contribution
The main goal of this dissertation is the investigation of privacy issues in
location-based proximity services and the proposal of effective defense tech-
niques.
The solutions proposed in the research area of LBS privacy preservation
(see Chapter 2 for a detailed survey) are not effective or directly applicable
to proximity services. In this thesis we present a rigorous study of location
privacy in proximity services, considering two categories of adversary: the
3http://www.loopt.com
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service provider (SP) and the other buddies. We propose a flexible way to let
users express privacy controls with respect to each category of adversaries.
Indeed, each user is allowed to specify his privacy requirements in terms of
regions of the geographical space: given a specific geographic position of the
user, the region including the position defines the highest location precision
exposed to the considered adversary.
We propose five protocols for enforcing users’ privacy requirements. All
the protocols have been formally studied and validated against a well defined
adversary model. Each protocol differs from the others for its requirements,
performance or privacy guarantees. A theoretical analysis of each protocol
formally supports the privacy guarantees and evaluates the expected per-
formance in terms of quality of service, privacy and costs. In addition, the
same performance aspects are measured in an extensive experimental work.
The practicality of our approach is illustrated by a complete implementation
of the techniques in a fully-functional system, including client applications
for web browsers and mobile phones.
Results presented in this dissertation are the outcome of research per-
formed at the EveryWare Lab., at the D.I.Co. department of the Universita`
degli Studi di Milano, and at the Center for Secure Information Systems at
George Mason University. Contributions included in following chapters have
been already partially published; in particular, the classification and con-
tributions presented in Chapter 2 derive from investigations included in [5],
and contributions presented in Chapter 3 are included in [16,34,36,39].
1.3 Outline
The dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we present the prob-
lem of privacy threat in LBS and a categorization of the attacks to the
privacy and of the defense techniques that have been proposed in literature.
In the same chapter, we present a study of the impact of the user movement
dataset used during the experimental analysis on the evaluation of defense
techniques, and we introduce a realistic simulation of user movement called
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MilanoByNight. Chapter 3 provides a deep analysis of the privacy threats
enabled by the use of proximity services, including a discussion of the ex-
isting techniques, a formalization of the privacy problem and the adversary
model. In the same chapter we propose five privacy preserving protocols, and
for each protocol we present a rigorous formal analysis of their properties.
Chapter 4 presents an extensive experimental evaluation, and the implemen-
tation of these protocols in a fully-functional instant messaging system. In
Chapter 5 we conclude the dissertation discussing the open problems and
summarizing the contributions of this work.
Chapter 2
Privacy models for Location
Based Services: an overview
This chapter presents an overview of the related work in the field of pri-
vacy in LBS. In Section 2.1 we introduce a categorization to the attacks to
users’ privacy in LBS, while in Section 2.2 we classify the main proposed
defense techniques according to the threats they have been designed for,
and according to other general features. Section 2.3 presents an analysis of
the impact of the user movement dataset on the experimental evaluation of
privacy preserving techniques.
2.1 A classification of attacks to LBS privacy
There is a privacy threat whenever an adversary is able to associate the iden-
tity of a user to information that the user considers private. In the case of
LBS, this sensitive association can be possibly derived from location-based
requests issued to service providers. More precisely, the identity and the
private information of a single user can be derived from requests issued by
a group of users as well as from available background knowledge. Figure 2.1
shows a graphical representation of this general privacy threat in LBS.
A privacy attack is a specific method used by an adversary to obtain the
5
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Figure 2.1: General privacy threat in LBS
sensitive association. Privacy attacks can be divided into categories mainly
depending on several parameters that characterize the adversary model. An
adversary model has three main components: a) the target private informa-
tion, b) the ability to obtain the messages exchanged during service, and c)
the background knowledge and the inferencing abilities available to the ad-
versary. The target private information is the type of information that the
adversary would like to associate with a specific individual, like e.g., her po-
litical orientation, or, more specifically, her location. Different classes of ad-
versaries may also have different abilities to obtain the messages exchanged
with the service provider, either by eavesdropping the communication chan-
nels or by accessing stored data at the endpoints of the communication.
This determines, for example, the availability to the adversary of a single
message or multiple messages, messages from a specific user or from multiple
users, etc.. Finally, the adversary may have access to external knowledge,
like e.g., phone directories, lists of members of certain groups, voters lists,
and even presence information for certain locations, and may be able to
perform inferences, like joining information from messages with external in-
formation as well as more involved reasoning. For example, even when a
request does not explicitly contain the sensitive association (e.g., by using
pseudo-identifiers to avoid identification of the issuer), the adversary may
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re-identify the issuer by joining location data in the request with presence
data from external sources. Regarding background knowledge, two extreme
cases can be considered. When no background knowledge is available, a pri-
vacy threat exists if the sensitive association can be obtained only from the
messages in the service protocol. When “complete” background knowledge
is available, the sensitive association is included and the privacy violation
occurs independently from the service request.
Hence, privacy attacks should not only be categorized in terms of the
target private information, and of the availability to the adversary of ser-
vice protocol messages (the first two of the main components mentioned
above), but also in terms of the available background knowledge and infer-
encing abilities. In the following, we list some categories of privacy attacks
specifically enabled by background knowledge.
• Attacks exploiting quasi-identifiers in requests;
• Snapshot versus historical attacks;
• Single- versus multiple-issuer attacks;
• Attacks exploiting knowledge of the defense;
Each category is discussed in the rest of this section.
2.1.1 Attacks exploiting quasi-identifiers
Either part of the sensitive association can be discovered by joining informa-
tion in a request with external information. When we discover the identity
of the issuer (or even restrict the set of candidate issuers) we call the part of
the request used in the join quasi-identifier. For example, when the location
data in the request can be joined with publicly available presence data to
identify an individual, we say that location data act as quasi-identifier. Simi-
larly to privacy preserving database publication, the recognition of what can
act as quasi-identifier in service request is essential to identify the possible
attacks (as well as to design appropriate defenses).
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2.1.2 Snapshot versus historical attacks
Many of the first approaches presented in the literature [6, 23, 27, 40] have
proposed techniques to ensure a user’s privacy in the case in which the
adversary can acquire a single request issued by that user. More specifically,
these approaches do not consider attacks based on the correlation of requests
made at different time instants. An example are attacks exploiting the
ability of the adversary to link a set of requests, i.e., to understand that the
requests have been issued by the same (anonymous) user.
When historical correlation is ignored, we say that the corresponding
threats are limited to the snapshot case. Intuitively, it is like the adversary
can only obtain a snapshot of the messages being exchanged for the service at
a given instant, while not having access to the complete history of messages.
In contrast with the snapshot case, in the historical case it is assumed
that the adversary is able to link a set of requests. Researchers [3, 25]
have considered such a possibility. Several techniques exist to link different
requests to the same user, with the most trivial ones being the observation of
the same identity or pseudo-identifier in the requests, and others being based
on spatiotemporal correlations. We call request trace a set of requests that
the adversary can correctly associate to a single user. We use Example 1 to
show that defense techniques for the snapshot cases cannot straightforwardly
be used in the historical case.
Example 1. Suppose Alice requires 3-anonymity and issues a request r. An
algorithm safe against attacks exploiting knowledge of the defense is used to
generalize r into a request r′ whose spatiotemporal region includes only Alice,
Bob, and Carl. Afterwards, Alice issues a new request r1 that is generalized
into a request r′1 whose spatiotemporal region includes only Alice, Ann, and
John. Suppose the adversary is able to link requests r′ and r′1, i.e., he is
able to understand that the two requests have been issued by the same user.
The adversary can observe that neither Bob nor Carl can be the issuer of r′1,
because they are not in the spatiotemporal region of r′1; Consequently, they
cannot be the issuers of r′ either. Analogously, considering the spatiotem-
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poral region in r′, he can derive that Ann and John cannot be the issuers of
the two request. Therefore, the adversary can identify Alice as the issuer of
r′ and r′1.
In this example, in addition to adversary’s ability of using location as
quasi-identifier, the ability to link requests is crucial for the attack to be
successful.
2.1.3 Single versus multiple-issuer attacks
When the adversary model limits the requests that can be obtained to those
being issued by a single (anonymous) user, we say that all the attacks are
single-issuer attacks. When the adversary model admits the possibility that
multiple requests from multiple users are acquired, and the adversary is
able to understand if two requests are issued by different users, we have a
new important category of attacks, called multiple-issuer attacks. Note that
this is an orthogonal classification with respect to snapshot and historical.
Example 2 shows that, in the multiple-issuer case, an adversary can infer
the sensitive association for a user even if the identity of that user is not
revealed to the adversary.
Example 2. Suppose Alice issues a request r and that the adversary can
only understand that the issuer is one of the users in a set S of potential
issuers. However, if all of the users in S issue requests from which the
adversary can infer the same private information inferred from r, then the
adversary can associate that private information to Alice as well.
In the area of privacy in databases, this kind of attack is known as
homogeneity attack [32]. In LBS, differently from the general case (depicted
in Figure 2.1), in the snapshot, multiple-issuer case, a single request for
each user in a group is considered. More involved and dangerous threats
can occur in the historical, multiple-issuer case.
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2.1.4 Attacks exploiting knowledge of the defense
In the security research area, it is frequently assumed that the adversary
knows the algorithms used for protecting information, and indeed the algo-
rithms are often released to the public. We have shown [35] that the first
proposals for LBS privacy protection ignored this aspect leading to solutions
subject to so called inversion attacks. As an example of these attacks, con-
sider a defense technique that produces a LBS request with a generalized
spatial region instead of the exact location (i.e., a spatial cloaking technique),
and suppose that this request is observed by the adversary. Suppose also
that he gets to know the identity of the four potential issuers of that request,
since he knows who was in that region at the time of the request; Still he
cannot identify who, among the four, is the actual issuer, since cloaking has
been applied to ensure 4-anonymity. However, if he knows the cloaking algo-
rithm, he can simulate its application to the specific location of each of the
candidates, and exclude any candidate for which the resulting cloaked re-
gion is different from the one in the observed request. Some of the proposed
algorithms are indeed subject to this attack. Kalnis et al. [27] show that
each generalization function satisfying a property called reciprocity is not
subject to the inversion attack. Recently, Deutsch et al. [14] observed that
even if the reciprocity property is satisfied, if the generalization function
produces generalized regions of different size or position for different users
inside the same anonymity set, an adversary knowing the generalization
could still break anonymity. In our chapter, depending on the assumption
in the adversary model about the knowledge of the defense algorithm we
distinguish def-aware attacks from def-unaware attacks.
2.2 Defenses to LBS privacy threats
Defense techniques can be categorized referring to the attacks’ classifica-
tion reported above, depending on which specific attacks they have been
designed for. However, there are other important criteria to distinguish
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defense approaches:
1. Defense technique: Identity anonymity versus private information ob-
fuscation versus encryption
2. Defense architecture: Centralized versus decentralized
3. Defense validation: Theoretical versus experimental.
The different defense techniques can be classified as anonymity-based if
they aim at protecting the association between an individual and her private
information by avoiding the re-identification of the individual through a re-
quest (or a sequence of requests). This is achieved by transforming the parts
of the original request acting as quasi-identifiers to obtain a generalized re-
quest. On the contrary, techniques based on private information obfuscation
aim to protect the same association by transforming the private information
contained in the original request, often assuming that the identity of the in-
dividual can be obtained. Finally, encryption-based techniques use private
information retrieval (PIR) methods that can potentially protect both the
identity of the issuer and the private information in the request.
Centralized defense architectures assume the existence of one or more
trusted entities acting as a proxy for service requests and responses between
the users and the service providers. The main role of the proxy is to trans-
form requests and possibly responses according to different techniques in
order to preserve the privacy of the issuers. Decentralized architectures, on
the contrary do not assume intermediate entities between users and service
providers. Among the benefits of centralized architectures are a) the ability
of the proxy to use information about a group of users (e.g., their location)
in order to more effectively preserve their privacy, and b) the availability of
more computational and communication resources than the users’ devices.
The main drawbacks are considered the overheads in updating on the proxy
the information about the users, and the need for the user to trust these
entities.
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A third criterion to distinguish the defenses that have been proposed is
the validation method that has been used. In some cases, formal results,
based on some assumptions, have been provided so that a certain privacy is
guaranteed in all scenarios in which the assumptions hold. In other cases,
only an experimental evaluation, usually based on synthetic data, is pro-
vided. In Section 2.3 we discuss how this approach may be critical if the
actual service deployment environment does not match the one used in the
evaluation.
In this section we classify the main proposals appeared in the literature
according to this categorization.
2.2.1 Anonymity based defenses
Most of the techniques proposed in the LBS literature to defend privacy
through anonymity consider the location as a quasi-identifier. Indeed, it
is implicitly or explicitly assumed that background knowledge can in some
cases lead an adversary to infer the identity of the issuer given her location at
a given time. Consequently, the target private information for the considered
attacks is usually the specific service being requested, or the location of the
issuer whenever that location cannot be used as quasi-identifier.1
When the location acts as a quasi-identifier, the defense technique trans-
forms the location information in the original request into a generalized lo-
cation. In the following we call anonymity set of a generalized request, the
set of users that, considering location information as quasi-identifier, are not
distinguishable from the issuer.
Centralized defenses against snapshot, single-issuer and def-unaware
attacks.
Anonymity based defenses with centralized architectures assume the exis-
tence of a trusted proxy that is aware of the movements of a large number
1Indeed, location cannot be the target private information when it can be found ex-
plicitly associated with identities in background knowledge.
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of users. We call this proxy Location-aware Trusted Server (LTS).
The first generalization algorithm that appeared in the literature is
named IntervalCloaking [23]. The paper proposes to generalize the requests
along the spatial and/or temporal dimension. For what concerns the spatial
dimension, the idea of the algorithm is to iteratively divide the total region
monitored by the LTS. At each iteration the current area qprev is partitioned
into quadrants of equal size. If less than k users are located in the quadrant
q where the issuer of the request is located, then qprev is returned. Other-
wise, iteration continues considering q as the next area. For what concerns
the temporal dimension, the idea is to first generalize the spatial location
(with the above algorithm) at a resolution not finer than a given thresh-
old. Then, the request is delayed until k users pass through the generalized
spatial location. This defense algorithm has only been validated through
experimental results.
An idea similar to the spatial generalization of IntervalCloaking is used
by Mokbel et al. [40] that propose Casper, a framework for privacy protection
that includes a generalization algorithm. The main difference with respect to
IntervalCloaking is that, in addition to the anonymity parameter k, the user
can specify the minimum size of the area that is sent to the SP. While it is not
explicit in the paper, the idea seems to be that, in addition to k-anonymity,
the algorithm also provides a form of location obfuscation. Similarly to
IntervalCloaking, Casper has been validated through experimental results.
Centralized defenses against snapshot, single-issuer and def-aware
attacks.
Many papers extend IntervalCloaking to provide defenses techniques that
guarantee anonymity when more conservative assumptions are made for the
adversary model. Kalnis et al. [27], propose the Hilbert Cloak algorithm
that provides anonymity also in the case in which the adversary knows the
generalization function. The idea of Hilbert Cloak is to exploit the Hilbert
space filling curve to define a total order among users’ locations. Then,
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Hilbert Cloak partitions the users into blocks of k: the first block from the
user in position 0 to the user in position k − 1 and so on (note that the
last block can contain up to 2 · k − 1 users). The algorithm then returns
the minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) computed considering the position
of the users that are in the same block as the issuer. The correctness of
the Hilbert Cloak algorithm is formally provided and the performance of the
algorithm has been also experimentally evaluated.
A different algorithm, called CliqueCloak is proposed by Gedik et al. [18].
The main difference with respect to the IntervalCloaking algorithm is that
CliqueCloak computes the generalization among the users that actually issue
a request and not among the users that are potential issuers. Indeed, Clique-
Cloak collects original requests without forwarding them to the SP until it
is possible to find a spatiotemporal generalization that includes at least k
pending requests. Then, the requests are generalized and forwarded to the
SP. The advantage of the proposed technique, whose correctness is formally
proved, is that it allows the users to personalize the degree of anonymity as
well as the maximum tolerable spatial and temporal generalizations. How-
ever, the algorithm has high computational costs and it can be efficiently
executed only for small values of k.
In [35] Mascetti et al. present another three generalization algorithms
that are proved to guarantee anonymity against snapshot, single-issuer and
def-aware attacks. The aim is to provide anonymity while minimizing the
size of the generalized location. The algorithm with the best performance
with respect to this metric is called Grid. Intuitively, this algorithm par-
titions all users according to their position along one dimension. Then, it
considers the users in the same block as the issuer and it partitions them
according to their location along the other dimension. Finally, each block
has at least cardinality k and the algorithm computes the generalized loca-
tion as the minimum bounding rectangle (MBR) that covers the location of
the users in the same block as the issuer.
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Decentralized defenses against snapshot, single-issuer attacks.
Some papers propose defense techniques that do not require a centralized ar-
chitecture. Chow et al. [13] propose a decentralized solution called CloakP2P
in which it is assumed that users can communicate with each other using
an ad-hoc network. Basically, before sending the request, a user looks for
the k − 1 closest users in the neighborhood through the ad-hoc network.
The location information of the request is then generalized to the region
containing these users and the request is issued to the server through one
of these users that is randomly selected. This algorithm guarantees privacy
only against def-unaware attacks and it is evaluated through experimental
results only.
Prive` is a distributed protocol based on the Hilbert Cloak algorithm
( [22]). In this case, the data structure that contains the positions of the users
on the Hilbert curve is a B+-tree that is distributed among the users in the
system. The generalization is a distributed algorithm that traverses the tree
starting from the root and finds the set of users containing the issuer. The
algorithm is proven to be correct and guarantees privacy also against def-
aware attacks. However, this solution suffers from some scalability issues.
To address these issues, Ghinita et al. [21] propose the MobiHide algorithm
which improves the scalability but that does not guarantee anonymity if
the generalization algorithm is known to the adversary. The algorithm is
formally validated.
A different decentralized solution is proposed by Hu et al. [26]. The
main characteristic of the proposed technique is that it does not require the
users to disclose their locations during the anonymization process. Indeed,
it is assumed that a user’s devices is able to measure the closeness from its
peers through its omnidirectional antenna (using WiFi signal, for example).
When a request is generalized, the distance information is used to compute
the anonymity set and the generalized location is obtained through a secure
computation among the users in the anonymity set. The proposed approach
is safe against def-aware attacks and its correctness is formally proved.
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Centralized defenses against historical, single-issuer attacks.
Several papers further extend the ideas of IntervalCloaking to provide a
defense in the historical case. The problem of anonymity in the historical,
single-issuer case has been first investigated in [7]. In the paper it is shown
that the defense technique for the snapshot case cannot be straightforwardly
applied to provide protection against a historical attack. In addition, a
centralized algorithm is proposed. A brief description of the formalization of
the problem presented in the paper follows. To define the notion of historical
anonymity, it is reasonable to assume that the LTS not only stores in its
database the set of requests issued by each user, but also stores for each
user the sequence of her location updates. This sequence is called Personal
History of Locations (PHL). More formally, the PHL of user u is a sequence
of 3D points (〈x1, y1, t1〉, . . . , 〈xm, ym, tm〉), where 〈xi, yi〉, for i = 1, . . . ,m,
represents the position of u (in two-dimensional space) at the time instant
ti. A PHL (〈x1, y1, t1〉, . . . , 〈xm, ym, tm〉) is defined to be LT-consistent with
a set of requests r1, . . . , rn issued to a SP if for each request ri there exists an
element 〈xj , yj , tj〉 in the PHL such that the area of ri contains the location
identified by the point xj , yj and the time interval of ri contains the instant
tj . Then, given the set R¯ of all requests issued to a certain SP, a subset
of requests R¯′ = {r1, . . . , rm} issued by the same user u is said to satisfy
Historical k-Anonymity if there exist k−1 PHLs P1, . . . , Pk−1 for k−1 users
different from u, such that each Pj , j = 1, . . . , k − 1, is LT-consistent with
R′.
Following the main ideas presented in [7] other anonymization techniques
for the historical case have been proposed in [12, 50]. The work in [12] also
aims at providing protection against a def-aware attack, however it is not
clear if the proposed algorithm achieves this goal since it is only evaluated
through experimental results. The work in [50] proposes two generalization
algorithms, the first one, called plainKAA, exploits the same general idea
presented in [7]. The second one is an optimization of the first, based on the
idea that in the generalization of the requests the users that were not in the
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anonymity set of a previous request can contribute to anonymity protection.
It is unclear if this optimization can preserve historical k-anonymity. Both
algorithms are validated through experimental results only.
Mascetti et al. propose a formal model for the historical case [37] and
experimentally show that, under certain conservative assumptions, it is not
possible to guarantee anonymity without generalizing the user locations to
large areas. Under these assumptions, considered in most of the related work
on the snapshot case, the adversary knows the association between each
user identity and the location of that user. The ProvidentHider algorithm
is proposed to guarantee anonymity in the historical case under the relaxed
assumptions that the adversary knows this association only when users are
located in certain areas (e.g., workplaces). The correctness of the algorithm
is formally proved and its applicability is experimentally evaluated.
The Greedy algorithm for historical k-anonymity We now present
a simple centralized defense that belongs to this category. This algorithm
enforces historical anonymity, and it will be used as reference algorithm in
Section 2.3.
Our algorithm uses a snapshot anonymization algorithm, like already
mentioned Grid, that is safe against snapshot, single-issuer and def-aware
attacks. We modify this algorithm by adding the requirement that the
perimeter of the MBR be always smaller than a user-given maxP value.
To achieve this, we basically shrink the obtained MBR from the snapshot
algorithm by recursively removing users that are distant from the issuer
until the perimeter of the MBR is smaller than maxP .
The idea of the Greedy algorithm was first proposed in [7] and a similar
algorithm was also described in [50]. This algorithm computes the general-
ization of the first request r in a trace using an algorithm for the snapshot
case. (In our implementation, we use Grid as the snapshot algorithm to
compute the generalization of the first request.) When this first request is
generalized, the set A of users located in the generalized location for the
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first request is stored. The generalized locations of each subsequent request
r′ that is linked with r is then taken as the MBR of the location of the users
in A at the time of r′. As in the modification of the Grid algorithm, when
the MBR is larger than maxP , we recursively shrink it until its perimeter
is smaller than maxP . Algorithm 1 gives the pseudocode. This algorithm
is called initially with the first request r and empty set A = ∅, and subse-
quently, it is called with the successive request and the A′ returned from the
previous execution.
Centralized defenses against multiple-issuer attacks.
Preliminary results on the privacy leaks determined by multiple-issuer at-
tacks are reported in [4]. Defenses for this kind of attacks are based on
accurately generalizing location (as a quasi-identifier) in order to obtain QI-
groups of requests with a certain degree of diversity in private values. A
defense against multiple-issuer attacks both in the snapshot and in a lim-
ited version of the historical case is proposed by Riboni et Al. [42] using
a combination of identity anonymity and private information obfuscation
techniques. Further research is needed along this line. For example, to
understand under which conditions close values in private information can
really be considered different (e.g., location areas).
2.2.2 Defenses based on private information obfuscation
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, these defenses aim at obfus-
cating private information released by users’ requests as opposed to general-
izing quasi-identifiers. To the best of our knowledge, all of the techniques in
this category consider location as the private information to be protected,
and implicitly or explicitly assume that user identity is known to the adver-
sary or could be discovered. In the following of this chapter, we use location
obfuscation to denote the general category of defenses aimed at obfuscating
the exact location as private information of the (possibly identified) issuer.
Differently from the anonymity based defenses considering location as
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Algorithm 1 Greedy
Input: a request r, an anonymity set A, anonymity level k, and a maximum
perimeter maxP .
Output: a generalized request r′ and an anonymity set A′.
Method:
1: find the MBR of all the current locations (at the time of request r) of
users in A (note that if A = ∅ then the MBR is empty).
2: if (the perimeter of the MBR is smaller than maxP ) then
3: if (|A| > 1) then
4: replace the spatial information in r with the MBR, obtaining r′
5: let A′ = A
6: else
7: call Grid algorithm∗ with r, k, and maxP , obtaining r′
8: let A′ be the set of users currently in the spatial region of r′
9: end if
10: else
11: recursively shrink the MBR until its perimeter is smaller than maxP
12: replace the spatial region in r with the resulting MBR, obtaining r′
13: let A′ be the set of users currently located in the resulting MBR
14: if (|A′| ≤ 1) then
15: call Grid algorithm with r, k, and maxP , obtaining r′
16: let A′ be the set of users currently in the spatial region of r′
17: end if
18: end if
19: return r′ and A′
∗ Instead of Grid, other snapshot algorithms can be used here.
quasi-identifier, in this case it is less important to know the location of
other users in order to provide privacy protection. For this reason, most of
the location obfuscation techniques do not require a common location-aware
trusted entity and, according to our categorization, they have a decentralized
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architecture. Sometimes these defenses are also claimed to provide a form
of k-anonymity, leading to confusion with anonymity based defenses. The
underlying idea is that due to the obfuscation, the location of the issuer (who
is possibly not anonymous at all) cannot be distinguished among k possible
locations. In order to avoid confusion this property should be called location
anonymity.
The idea of protecting location privacy by obfuscating location informa-
tion was first proposed by Gruteser et al. [24]. The technique is aimed at
avoiding the association of a user with a sensitive area she is crossing or
approaching. The proposed defense is based on appropriately suspending
user requests, ensuring that the location of the user may be confused among
at least other k areas. The proposed technique requires a centralized entity,
but it should not be difficult to modify the proposed algorithm so that it
could be run directly on the users’ mobile device. This defense algorithm is
only validated via experiments. It is also not clear which privacy guarantees
are provided if the adversary knows the algorithm.
Duckham et al. propose a protocol that allows a user to obtain the result
of 1-NN (Nearest Neighbor) queries among a set of points of interest without
disclosing her exact location [15]. The protocol is iterative. At the first
iteration the user sends her obfuscated location to the SP that replies with
the pair 〈q, C〉 where q is the point of interest having the highest confidence
C of being the closest to the user. At each following iteration, the user can
decide whether to provide additional location information in order to obtain
a result with higher confidence. It is not specified how the generalization of
the user’s location is computed.
A different approach, proposed by Kido et al. [30], consists in sending,
together with the real request, a set of fake requests. Since the adversary
cannot distinguish the real request from the fake ones, it cannot discover the
real location of the issuer, among the locations of the fake requests. This
decentralized solution is effective also in the case in which the adversary
knows the defense function. However, this solution has the problem that, in
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order to effectively protect the location information, a high number of fake
requests should be sent hence impacting on the communication costs. The
technique is validated through experimental results only.
In [2], Ardagna et al. propose to use a combination of location obfus-
cation techniques and a metric to measure the obfuscation achieved. The
difference with respect to other approaches is that the resulting obfuscation
area may not contain the actual location of the issuer; moreover, the lo-
cation measurement error introduced by sensing technologies is taken into
account. It is not formally proved that the proposed defense protects against
def-aware attacks. According to our categorization, the paper considers a
centralized architecture, even if the proposed obfuscation techniques can be
probably run on the client side.
Yiu et al. [51] proposed a different solution to obfuscate location infor-
mation, specific for LBS requests that require K-NN queries. The idea of
the algorithm, named SpaceTwist, is to issue each request as if it would
originate from a location different from the real user location. The request
may be repeated (from the same fake location) incrementally retrieving more
nearest neighbor resources, until a satisfactory answer for the real location
is obtained. This solution is particularly interesting since it does not require
the existence of the centralized entity that provide privacy protection and
involves no range NN queries on the server side. In the paper it is also
formally shown how the adversary can compute the area where the user is
possibly located under the assumptions that the adversary only knows the
fake location, the number of requested resources, the replies from the server
and the termination condition of the algorithm.
Solutions based on location obfuscation and/or encryption have also
been proposed in the context of location-based proximity services, that we
describe in detail in Chapter 3. A more detailed survey of the solutions
proposed in literature for this category of services is in Section 3.1.
Referring to our categorization of attacks, the existing location obfusca-
tion defenses focus on snapshot and single-issuer attacks. Example 3 shows
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that, in some cases, a historical attack can further restrict the possible lo-
cations of a user.
Example 3. A request issued by Alice is obfuscated in such a way that an
adversary only knows that Alice is located in an area A1 at time t1. After
a short time, Alice issues a second request that is obfuscated in such a way
that the adversary knows that Alice is located somewhere in area A2 at time
t2. Now, assume that there is a subregion A
′ of A2 such that, due to speed
constraints, no matter where Alice were located in A1 at time t1, she has no
way to get to A′ at time t2. Now the adversary knows that at time t2, Alice
cannot be located in A′ and hence she must be in A2 \A′.
This class of dynamic attacks based on the knowledge of speed con-
straints have been further investigated by Ghinita et al. [19] for generic
location-based services. Recently, Freni et al. [17] proposed two techniques
based on spatio-temporal obfuscation to protect privacy in the context of
resource publishing services in geo-social networks, also considering an ad-
versary aware of the maximum velocity of the users.
2.2.3 Encryption based defenses
We call encryption based, the defense proposals based on private informa-
tion retrieval (PIR) techniques. The general objective of a PIR protocol is
to allow a user to issue a query to a database without the database learning
the query. In [20] this techniques is used to protect users’ privacy in the LBS
that computes 1-NN queries. The proposed solution is proved to solve the
privacy problem under the most conservative assumptions about the adver-
sary model as it does not reveal any information about the requests to the
adversary. Nevertheless, some concerns arises about the applicability of the
proposed technique. First, the proposed solution applies to 1-NN queries
only and it is not clear how it could be extended to other kinds of queries
like K-NN queries or range queries. Second, this technique has high com-
putational and communication overhead. Indeed, the experimental results
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shown in the paper give evidence that, although using a small database of
objects to be retrieved, the computation time on the server side is in the
order of seconds, while the communication cost is in the order of megabytes.
In particular, the amount of data that needs to be exchanged between the
server and the client is larger than the size of the database itself. It is not
clear for which kind of services this overhead could be tolerable.
Two more recent solutions propose PIR protocols that are aided by the
presence of a secure hardware on the server [29, 41]. The secure hardware
is a tamper-resistant additional CPU installed on the server that can run
programs independently from the server itself and that can communicate
directly with the clients over secure channel. In the solution proposed by
Khoshgozaran et al. [29], upon receiving a K-NN query the secure hardware
computes a set of cells that contains all the points of the query result.
The client then retrieves the content of these cells using a PIR protocol.
Papadopoulos et al. [41] observe that this approach could still be vulnerable
to attacks based on the cardinality of the retrieved cells, as the SP can still
observe the number of queries issued by one client. Therefore, their solution
requires the server to compute a query plan to be distributed to the client
before issuing a query. The query plan indicates the exact number of PIR
retrievals that must be issued by a client during a transaction. Even if a
particular query result could be retrieved with less retrievals, to ensure safety
the client is required to issue dummy retrievals until the number indicated
in the query plan is reached.
2.3 Impact of realistic simulations on the evalua-
tion of defense techniques
As we motivated in the previous section, the correctness of an anonymity-
preserving technique can be formally proved based on the specific assump-
tions made on the adversary model. However, in practice, different ad-
versaries may have different background knowledge and inferencing abili-
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ties. Hence, one approach consists in stating conservative assumptions un-
der which anonymity can be guaranteed against a broad range of potential
adversaries. The drawback of this approach is clear from the conservative
assumptions about location knowledge considered so far by anonymity based
solutions: in order to protect from the occasional knowledge by the adver-
sary about people present at a given location (unknown to the defender), it
is (often implicitly) assumed the same knowledge for all locations. Such as-
sumptions are not realistic and lead to overprotecting the users’ anonymity,
hence negatively impacting the quality of service. A different approach,
taken by several researcher is experimental evaluation. Since large set of
real, accurate data are very hard to obtain, in most cases experiments are
based on synthetic data generated through simulators. In this section we
focus on validating anonymity-based defense techniques, and we show that
in order to obtain significant results, simulations must be very carefully de-
signed. In addition to evaluating the Greedy algorithm as a representative of
historical anonymity based defenses, we are interested in the following more
general questions: a) how much does the adversary model affect the privacy
obtained by the defense according to the evaluation?, and b) how much does
the specific service deployment model affect the results of the evaluation?
It should be noted that question b) also applies to those experimental
evaluations that aim to show the effectiveness and the impact of privacy-
preserving techniques that not necessarily oriented at enforcing anonymity,
like the obfuscation or encryption based defenses already discussed in the
previous section.
2.3.1 The MilanoByNight simulation
In order to carefully design the simulation, we concentrate on a special cate-
gory of proximity based services, called friend-finders, that can be accessed
anonymously or by using a pseudonym. Commercial examples of such ser-
vices are mobile dating services like Grindr or MeetMoi, in which users are
looking for other people with similar sexual orientation. As these services
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can be accessed anonymously, anonymity-based techniques for LBS like the
ones presented in this chapter are normally applicable. In Chapter 3 we
will also employ this simulation during the experimental evaluation of the
defense techniques based on private information obfuscation specifically de-
signed for proximity services.
A first privacy threat for a user of this proximity-based service is the
association of that user’s identity with the service parameters and, in par-
ticular, with the group of target participants, since this can reveal the user’s
interests or other private information. Even if the user’s identity is not ex-
plicit in a request, an adversary can obtain this association, by using the
location information of a request as a quasi-identifier.
A second privacy threat is the association of the user’s identity with
the locations visited by that user. We recall that this association takes
place independently from the service requests if the adversary’s background
location knowledge is “complete” (see Section 2.1). However, consider the
case in which the background knowledge is “partial” i.e., it contains the
association between user identity and location information only for some
users in some locations at some time instants. Example 4 shows how, in
this case, an adversary can exploit a set of friend-finder requests to derive
location information that are not included in the background knowledge.
Example 4. User A issues a friend-finder request r1. An adversary obtains
r1 and discovers that A is the issuer by joining the location information in
the request with his background knowledge (i.e., the location information of
r1 is used as quasi-identifier). Then, A moves to a different location and
issues a request r2. The adversary obtains r2, but in this case his background
knowledge does not contain sufficient information to identify the issuer of
the request. However, if the adversary can understand that r1 and r2 are
linked (i.e., issued from the same issuer), then he derives that A is also the
issuer of r2 and hence obtains new location information about A.
We suppose that the friend-finder service is primarily used by people dur-
ing entertainment hours, especially at night. Therefore, the ideal dataset for
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our experiments should represent movements of people on a typical Friday
or Saturday night in a big city, when users tend to move to entertainment
places. To our knowledge, currently there are no datasets like this publicly
available, specially considering that we want to have large scale, individ-
ual, and precise location data (i.e., with the same approximation of current
consumer GPS technology).
Relevant Simulation Parameters
For our experiments we want to artificially generate movements for 100, 000
users on the road network of Milan2. The total area of the map is 324
km2, and the resulting average density is 308 users/km2. The simulation
includes a total of 30, 000 home buildings and 1, 000 entertainment places;
the first value is strictly related to the considered number of users, while
the second is based on real data from public sources which also provide
the geographical distribution of the places. Our simulation starts at 7 pm
and ends at 1 am. During these hours, each user moves from house to an
entertainment place, spends some time in that place, and possibly moves to
another entertainment place or goes back home.
All probabilities related to users’ choices are modeled with probability
distributions. In order to have a realistic model of these distributions, we
prepared a survey to collect real users data. We are still collecting data, but
the current parameters are based on interviews of more than 300 people in
our target category.
Weaknesses of mostly random movement simulations
Many papers in the field of privacy preservation in LBS use artificial data
generated by moving object simulators to evaluate their techniques. How-
ever, most of the simulators are usually not able to reproduce a realistic
behavior of users. For example, objects generated by the Brinkhoff genera-
2 100, 000 is an estimation of the number of people participating in the service we
consider.
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tor [10] cannot be aggregated in certain places (e.g., entertainment places).
Indeed, once an object is instantiated, the generator chooses a random des-
tination point on the map; after reaching the destination, the object disap-
pears from the dataset. For the same reason, it is not possible to reproduce
simple movement patterns (e.g.: a user going out from her home to another
place and then coming back home), nor to simulate that a user remains for
a certain time in a place.
Despite these strong limitations, we made our best effort to use the
Brinkhoff simulator to generate a set of user movements with characteristics
as close as possible to those described above. For example, in order to
simulate entertainment places, some random points on the map, among
those points on the trajectories of users, were picked. The simulation has the
main purpose of understanding if testing privacy preservation over random
movement simulations gives significantly different results with respect to
more realistic simulations.
Generation of user movements with a context simulator
In order to obtain a dataset consistent with the parameters specified above,
we need a more sophisticated simulator. For our experiments, we have cho-
sen to customize the Siafu context simulator [33]. With a context simulator
it is possible to design models for agents, places and context. Therefore, it
is possible to define particular places of aggregation and make users dynam-
ically choose which place to reach and how long to stay in that place.
The most relevant parameters characterizing the agents’ behavior are
derived from our survey. For example, one parameter that characterizes the
behavior of the agents is the average time spent in an entertainment place;
This value was collected in our survey and resulted to have the following
values: 9.17% of the users stays less than 1 hour, 34.20% stays between 1
and 2 hours, 32.92% stays between 2 and 3 hours, 16.04% stays between 3
and 4 hours, and 7.68% stays more than 4 hours. Details on the simulation
can be found in [38].
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2.3.2 Experimental settings
In our experiments we used two datasets of users movements. The dataset
AB (Agent-Based) was generated with the customized Siafu simulator, while
the datasetMRM (Mostly Random Movement) was created with the Brinkhoff
simulator. In both cases, we simulate LBS requests for the friend-finder
service by choosing random users in the simulation, we compute for each
request the generalization according to a given algorithm, and finally we
evaluate the anonymity of the resulting request as well as the Quality of
Service (QoS).
Different metrics can be defined to measure QoS for different kind of
services. For instance, for the friend-finder service we are considering, it
would be possible to measure how many times the generalization leads the
SP to return an incorrect result i.e., the issuer is not notified of a close-by
friend or, vice versa, the issuer is notified for a friend that is not close-by.
While this metric is useful for this specific application, we want to measure
the QoS independently from the specific kind of service. For this reason, in
this chapter we evaluate how QoS degrades in terms of the perimeter of the
generalized location.
In addition to the dataset of user movements, we identified other two pa-
rameters characterizing the deployment model that significantly affect the
experimental results: the number of users in the system, which remains
almost constant at each time instant and the user-required degree of indis-
tinguishability k. These two parameters, together with the most important
others, are reported in Table 2.1, with the values in bold denoting default
values.
We also identified three relevant parameters that characterize the adver-
sary model. The parameter Pid−in indicates the probability that the adver-
sary can identify a user when she is located in a entertainment place while
Pid−out is the probability that the adversary identifies a user in any other
location (e.g., while moving from home to a entertainment place). While
we also perform experiments where the two probabilities are the same, our
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Table 2.1: Parameter values
Parameter Values
dataset AB , MRM
number of users 10k, 20k, 30k, 40k, 50k, 60k, 70k, 80k, 90k, 100k
k 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60
Pid−in 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0
Pid−out 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1
Plink 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.87, 0.9, 1.0
scenario suggests as much more realistic a higher value for Pid−in (it is
considered ten times higher than Pid−out). This is due to the fact that
restaurants, pubs, movie theaters, and similar places are likely to have dif-
ferent ways to identify people (fidelity or membership cards, WiFi hotspots,
cameras, credit card payments, etc.) and in several cases more than one
place is owned by the same company that may have an interest in collecting
data about its customers. Finally, Plink indicates the probability that two
consecutive requests can be identified as issued by the same user.3 While
we perform our tests considering a full range of values, the specific default
value reported in the table is due to a recent study on the ability of linking
positions based on spatiotemporal correlation [49].
The experimental results we show in this section are obtained by running
the simulation for 100 issuers and then computing the average values.
In our experiments we evaluated two generalization algorithms. One al-
gorithm is Greedy which is described in Section 2.2 and is a representative of
the historical generalization algorithm proposed so far [7,12,50]. The other
algorithm is Grid which is briefly described in Section 2.2.1 is a represen-
tative of the snapshot generalization algorithms. In [35] Grid is shown to
have better performance (in terms of the quality of service) when compared
3The limitation to consecutive requests is because in our specific scenario we assume
linking is performed mainly through spatiotemporal correlation.
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to other snapshot generalization algorithms like, for example, Hilbert Cloak.
We also evaluated the privacy threat when no privacy preserving algorithm
is applied. The label NoAlg is used in the figures to identify results in this
particular case.
2.3.3 Impact of the adversary model on the evaluation of the
generalization algorithms
We now present a set of experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of
the adversary model on the anonymity provided by the generalization algo-
rithms.
Two main parameters characterizing the adversary model are Pid−in and
Plink. In Figure 2.2(a) we show the average privacy, in terms of probability
of re-identification, for different values of Pid−in when, in each test, Pid−out is
set to Pid−in/10. As expected, considering a trace of requests, the higher the
probability of identifying users in one or more of the regions from which the
requests in the trace were performed, the smaller is the level of anonymity.
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(a) Varying Pid−in (Pid−out = Pid−in/10).
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Figure 2.2: Average anonymity.
Figure 2.2(b) shows the impact of Plink on the average privacy. As
expected, high values of Plink lead to small values of privacy. Our results
show that the relation between the Plink and privacy is not linear. Indeed,
privacy depends almost linearly on the average length of the traces identified
by the adversary. In turn, the average length of the traces grows almost
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exponentially with the value of Plink.
To summarize the first set of experiments, our findings show that the
parameters that characterize the adversary model significantly affect the
evaluation of the generalization algorithms. This implies that when a gener-
alization algorithm is evaluated it is necessary to estimate realistic values for
these parameters. Indeed, an error in the estimation may lead to misleading
results.
2.3.4 Impact of the deployment model on the evaluation of
the generalization algorithms
We now show a set of experimental results designed to evaluate the impact
of the deployment model on the evaluation of the generalization algorithms.
Figure 2.3(a) shows that the average privacy obtained with Greedy and
Grid is not significantly affected by the size of the total population. Indeed,
both algorithms, independently from the total number of users, try to have
generalized locations that cover the location of k users, so the privacy of
the requests is not affected. However, when the density is high, the two
algorithms can generalize to a small area, while when the density is low, a
larger area is necessary to cover the location of k users (see Figure 2.3(b)).
On the contrary, the privacy obtained when no generalization is performed
is significantly affected by the total population. Indeed, a higher density
increases the probability of different users to be in the same location and
hence it increases privacy also if the requests are not generalized.
The set of tests reported in Figure 2.4 compares the privacy achieved by
the Greedy algorithm on the two datasets for different values of k and for
different values of QoS. The experiments on MRM were repeated trying also
larger values for the QoS threshold (maxP = 2000 and maxP = 4000), so
three different versions of MRM appear in the figures. In order to focus on
these parameters only, in these tests the probability of identification was set
to the same value for any place (Pid−in = Pid−out = 0.1), and for the MRM
dataset the issuer of the requests was randomly chosen only among those
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Figure 2.3: Performance evaluation for different values of the total popula-
tion.
that stay in the simulation for 3 hours, ignoring the ones staying for much
shorter time that inevitably are part of this dataset. This setting allowed us
to compare the results on the two datasets using the same average length of
traces identified by the adversary.
Figure 2.4(a) shows that the average privacy of the algorithm evaluated
on the AB dataset is much higher than on the MRM dataset. This is mainly
due to the fact that in AB users tend to concentrate in a few locations (the
entertainment places) and this enhances privacy. This is also confirmed by
a similar test performed without using any generalization of locations; we
obtained values constantly higher for the AB dataset (the average privacy
is 0.67 in AB and 0.55 in MRM).
In Figure 2.4(b) we show the QoS achieved by the algorithm in the two
datasets with respect to the average privacy achieved. This result confirms
that the level of privacy evaluated on the AB dataset using small values of
k and maxP for the algorithm cannot be observed on the MRM dataset
even with much higher values for these parameters.
From the experiments shown in Figure 2.4 we can conclude that if the
MRM dataset is used as a benchmark to estimate the values of k and
maxP that are necessary to provide a desired average level of privacy, then
the results will suggest the use of values that are over-protective. As a
consequence, it is possible that the service will exhibit a much lower QoS
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than the one that could be achieved with the same algorithm.
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Figure 2.4: Evaluation of the Greedy algorithm using AB and MRM data
sets. Pid−in = Pid−out = 0.1
The above results may still support the safety of using MRM , since
according to what we have seen above a technique achieving a certain level
of privacy may only do better in a real scenario. However, our second set of
experiments shows that this is not the case.
In Figure 2.5 we show the results we obtained by varying the probability
of identification. For this test, we considered two sets of issuers in the MRM
data set. One set is composed by users that stay in the simulation for 3
hours, (MRM long traces, in Figure 2.5), while the other contains issuers
randomly chosen in the entire set of users (MRM all traces, in Figure 2.5),
hence including users staying in the simulation for a much shorter time.
In Figure 2.5(a) and 2.5(b) we can observe that the execution on the
MRM dataset leads to evaluate a privacy level that is higher than the one
obtained on the AB dataset. In particular, the evaluation of the Grid al-
gorithm using the MRM dataset (Figure 2.5(b)), would suggest that the
algorithm is able to provide a high privacy protection. However, when evalu-
ating the same algorithm using the more realistic dataset AB, this conclusion
seems to be incorrect. In this case, the evaluation on the MRM dataset may
lead to underestimate the privacy risk, and hence to deploy services based
on generalization algorithms that may not provide the minimum required
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level of privacy.
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Figure 2.5: Average privacy using AB and MRM data sets. Pid−out =
Pid−in/10.
Chapter 3
Privacy preservation in
Proximity Services
In the previous chapter we presented the most relevant techniques to pre-
serve privacy in generic LBSs, in which a user issues a location-based request
to a SP, and does not want the SP to obtain sensitive information about
her. In the context of GeoSNs, however, other users participating in the
service may obtain the location information of a certain user, and this may
pose additional threats to her privacy.
The focus of this chapter is the problem of protecting privacy in location-
based proximity services, a particular category of service that is often offered
by GeoSN providers to let their users discover which of their buddies are
nearby. The existing techniques for LBS, presented in the previous chapter,
are not directly applicable to this scenario, as it will be explained in Sec-
tion 3.1. In the same section we present the works that have been already
presented in literature. In Section 3.2 we formally define the privacy prob-
lem, the privacy threats and the considered adversary model. Section 3.3
describes some protocols that we propose to enforce users’ privacy in this
context, including a formal analysis of each of the proposed protocols. The
implementation and experimental evaluation of the protocols will be pre-
sented in the next chapter.
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3.1 Related work
Computing proximity involves the continuous evaluation of spatial range
queries over a set of moving entities, with the radius range possibly changing
[11, 46]. The literature on this problem is both from the database, and
the mobile computing community; recent contributions are briefly surveyed
in [1], where an efficient algorithm for proximity detection named Strips
is presented. Another solution for efficient proximity detection has been
recently proposed by Yiu et al. [52]. The goal of this and similar approaches
is the efficiency in terms of computation and communication complexity,
while privacy issues are mostly ignored.
The techniques presented in Section 2.2 cannot be directly applicable to
the context of proximity based services. As already mentioned, anonymity-
based defenses aim to enforce the anonymous access to a LBS by ensuring
that a request cannot be reassociated to the original issuer. In the case
of proximity based services, we assume that the identity of the user may
be easily obtained or already known to the adversary, and we consider the
location of the user as a sensitive information to be protected. Most of
the defenses based on private information obfuscation that we mentioned in
Section 2.2.2 have been applied for LBS performing k-NN spatial queries,
and do not apply to proximity detection. Some encryption-based PIR ap-
proaches provide support for range and k-NN spatial queries, but they all
require the index of the database to be built oﬄine, and hence they are not
still suitable for a database of moving entities like users of a proximity ser-
vices, that requires frequent updates to the index structure. Khoshgozaran
et al. [28] propose a system to maintain an encrypted index on the server side
and efficiently update it, which makes it suitable for maintaining a database
of moving buddies. The system supports encrypted range and k-NN spatial
queries, hence it could be used to offer proximity based services. However,
the system requires users to be organized in groups, with each group shar-
ing a symmetric secret key, and all the users in a group must trust each
other. Furthermore, the proposed techniques for retrieving the query re-
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sults seem to be vulnerable to cardinality attacks, like the ones considered
by Papadopoulos et al. [41] for PIR techniques, if the SP has an a-priori
knowledge about the distribution of the users.
Ruppel et al. [43] propose a technique for privacy preserving proximity
computation based on the application of a distance preserving transforma-
tion on the location of the users. However, the SP is able to obtain the
exact distances between users, and this can lead to a privacy violation. For
example, having this knowledge, it is possible to construct a weighted graph
of all the users, assigning to each edge connecting two users their exact dis-
tance. It is easily seen that a “relative” distribution of the user locations can
be extracted from this graph. If the SP has a-priori knowledge about the
distribution of the users (as considered in our adversary model), it is possi-
ble to merge the distribution resulting from the graph with the a-priori one,
thus revealing some location information about the individuals. In addition,
there is no privacy guarantee with respect to the other users participating
in the service.
Zhong et al. propose three different techniques for privacy preservation
in proximity-based services called Louis, Lester and Pierre [53]. These tech-
niques are decentralized secure computation protocols based on public-key
cryptography. Louis is a three-parties secure computation protocol. By
running this protocol, a user A gets to know whether another user B is in
proximity without disclosing any other location information to B or to the
third party T involved in the protocol. T only helps A and B compute their
proximity, and it is assumed to follow the protocol and not to collude with
A or B. However, T learns whether A and B are in proximity. Considering
our adversary model, which will be explained in detail in Section 3.3, this
third party cannot be the SP that may use proximity information to violate
location privacy, and it is unlikely to be played by a third buddy since it
would involve significant resources. The Lester protocol allows a user A
to compute the exact distance from a user B only if the distance between
the two users is under a certain threshold chosen by B. The main advan-
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tage of these two techniques is that they protect a user’s privacy without
introducing any approximation in the computation of the proximity. How-
ever, Louis incurs in significant communication overheads, and Lester in
high computational costs. In addition, the only form of supported privacy
protection with respect to the buddies is the possibility for a user to refuse
to participate in the protocol initiated by a buddy if she considers the re-
quested proximity threshold too small. The Pierre protocol partitions the
plane where the service is provided into a grid, with each cell having edge
equal to the requested distance threshold. The locations of the users are
then generalized to the corresponding cell, and two users are considered in
proximity if they are located in the same cell or in two adjacent cells. The
achieved quality of service decreases as the requested proximity threshold
grows. We will explain in more detail the actual impact on service precision
in Section 4.1. Finally, it should be mentioned that Lester and Pierre proto-
cols are based on a buddy-to-buddy communication, and although this can
guarantee total privacy with respect to the SP (as no SP is involved in the
computation), scalability issues may arise since each time a user moves she
needs to communicate her new position to each of her buddies.
Another solution for privacy preserving computation of proximity, called
FriendLocator, has been proposed by Sˇiksˇnys et al. [48]. Similarly to Pierre,
two users are considered in proximity when they are located in the same
cell or two adjacent cells of the grid constructed considering the proximity
threshold shared by the users. An interesting aspect of the proposed solu-
tion is the location update strategy, which is designed to reduce the total
number of location updates to be sent by the users, hence reducing com-
munication costs. Two users share a hierarchy of grids, where each grid is
identified by a level. The larger the value of the level is, the finer the grid.
The highest level grid is the one in which the edge of a cell is equal to the
proximity threshold. The detection of proximity is then incremental, i.e.
if two users are in adjacent cells at the level n grid, then their respective
cells in the grid of level n+ 1 are checked, until they are detected either not
3.2. Problem definition 39
to be in proximity, or to be in proximity considering the highest level grid.
With this solution, when two users are detected not to be in proximity at a
certain level l, there is no need for them to check again the proximity until
one of them moves to a different cell of the level l grid. As a consequence,
less location updates are needed, and this is experimentally shown to sig-
nificantly reduce the total number of messages exchanged. However, the
FriendLocator protocol reveals some approximate information about the
distance of users to the SP (e.g. the level in which the incremental proxim-
ity detection protocol terminates and whether the buddies are in proximity
at that level). As already observed for the Louis protocol, in our adver-
sary model this information can lead to a privacy violation. Furthermore,
the impact on the quality of service of using a large proximity threshold is
identical to the Pierre protocol discussed above.
A more recent solution by the same authors [47], called VicinityLocator,
solves this problem by letting users specify their privacy preferences as spa-
tial granularities (see Section 3.2.2) independently from the requested prox-
imity threshold. A similar location update strategy is employed to minimize
the communication costs. However, similarly to FriendLocator, the SP
learns some information about the distance of the users, and this could lead
to a privacy violation in our adversary model.
3.2 Problem definition
In this section we formally define the service we are considering, the users’
privacy concerns and requirements, the adversary model, and the occurrence
of a privacy violation.
3.2.1 The proximity service
By issuing a proximity request, user A is interested to know, for each of her
buddies B, if the following condition is satisfied:
d(locA, locB) ≤ δA (3.1)
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where d(locA, locB) denotes the Euclidean distance between the reported
locations of A and B and δA is a threshold value given by A. When Equa-
tion 3.1 is true, we say that B is in the proximity of A. The proximity
relation is not symmetric, since δB may be different from δA,
Two different subcategories of proximity-based services can be identified,
based on how the buddies of a user are selected. If the buddies are explic-
itly added as “friends”, like in most social networks and instant messaging
applications, we call them “contact-list-based” services. On the contrary,
if the buddies are retrieved through a particular query e.g. based on their
interest, we call it a “query-driven” proximity service. Technically, the main
difference is that in the “contact-list-based” service it is reasonable to as-
sume that each user can share a secret with each of her buddies, as we do
in our proposed techniques. On the contrary, in the case of “query-driven”
services, the set of buddies may change dynamically, and the number of bud-
dies can be potentially very large. In this situation, it may not be practical
to share a secret with each buddy. This categorization is important when
discussing the applicability of a certain technique to a real-world scenario,
as in many solutions it is required that users share secret information.
With the presence of a service provider (SP), and in absence of privacy
concerns, a simple protocol can be devised to implement the proximity ser-
vice: The SP receives location updates from each user and stores their last
known positions, as well as the distance threshold δA for each user A. While
in theory each user can define different threshold values for different bud-
dies, in this chapter, for simplicity, we consider the case in which each user
A defines a single value δA for detecting the proximity of all of her buddies.
When the SP receives a location update, it can recompute the distance be-
tween A and each buddy (possibly with some filtering/indexing strategy for
efficiency) and communicate the result to A. In a typical scenario, if B is
in proximity, A may contact him directly or through the SP; however, for
our purposes, we do not concern ourselves as what A will do once notified.
In the following of this chapter we refer to the above protocol as the Naive
3.2. Problem definition 41
protocol.
3.2.2 Privacy concerns and privacy requirements
The privacy we are considering in the scenario of proximity-based services is
location privacy : we assume that a user is concerned about the uncontrolled
disclosure of her location information at specific times.
Considering the Naive protocol, it is easily seen that the SP obtains the
exact location of a user each time she issues a location update. Furthermore,
a user’s location information is also disclosed to her buddies. If Alice is in
the proximity of Bob (one of her buddies), then Bob discovers that Alice is
located in the circle centered in his location with radius δBob. Since δBob is
chosen by Bob and can be set arbitrarily without consent from Alice, Alice
has no control on the location information disclosed to Bob.
Our definition of location privacy is based on the idea that the users
should be able to control the location information to be disclosed. In the
considered services, a user may prefer the service provider to have as little
information about her location as possible, and the buddies not to know her
exact position, even when the proximity is known to them. Moreover, the
exchanged information should be protected from any eavesdropper.
In general, the level of location privacy can be represented by the uncer-
tainty that an external entity has about the position of the user. This uncer-
tainty is a geographic region, called minimal uncertainty region (MUR), and
its intuitive semantics is the following: the user accepts that the adversary
knows she is located in a MUR R, but no information should be disclosed
about her position within R.
In the solutions presented in this dissertation, each user can express
her privacy preferences by specifying a partition of the geographical space
defining the MURs that she wants guaranteed. For example, Alice specifies
that her buddies should never be able to find out the specific campus building
where Alice currently is; in this case, the entire campus area is the minimal
uncertainty region. The totality of these uncertainty regions for a user can
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be formally captured with the notion of spatial granularity.
While there does not exist a formal definition of spatial granularity that
is widely accepted by the research community, the idea behind this concept
is simple. Similar to a temporal granularity [8], a spatial granularity can
be considered a subdivision of the spatial domain into a discrete number of
non-overlapping regions, called granules. For simplicity, we consider only
granularities1 that partition the spatial domain, i.e., the granules of a gran-
ularity do not intersect and the union of all the granules in a granularity
yields exactly the whole spatial domain. Each granule of a granularity G is
identified by an index (or a label). We denote with G(i) the granule of the
granularity G with index i.
Users specify their privacy requirements via spatial granularities, with
each granule being a MUR. In our solutions we assume that a user A can
specify two granularities
GSPA and G
U
A
defining the minimum location privacy requirements for SP and for any other
user, respectively, as the two categories of potential adversaries.
The two extreme cases in which a user requires no privacy protection
and maximum privacy protection, respectively, can be naturally modeled.
In one extreme case, for example, if a user A does not want her privacy to be
protected with respect to her buddies then A sets her GUA privacy preference
to the bottom granularity ⊥ (a granularity that contains a granule for each
basic element, or pixel, of the spatial domain). In the other extreme, if
user A wants complete location privacy, for example with respect to the SP,
then she sets her GSPA privacy preference to the top granularity >, i.e., the
granularity that has a single granule covering the entire spatial domain. In
this case, A wants the entire spatial domain as MUR.
Our approach can be easily extended to model the case in which a user
specifies different granularities for different buddies or for different groups
1Here and in the following, when no confusion arises, we use the term “granularity” to
mean “spatial granularity”.
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of buddies. However, for the sake of clarity, we will assume that a single GUA
privacy is specified by each user.
3.2.3 Adversary model and privacy preservation
In the GeoSN setting, a typical user may have different privacy concerns
with respect to her buddies or with respect to third-party entities, like the
SP. For this reason, we choose to consider two separate adversary models,
one for the SP and one for the buddies, respectively. Assuming the SP and
the buddies as potential adversaries, also models other types of adversaries.
Firstly, it models the case of an external entity taking control of the SP
system or of a buddy’s system. Secondly, it models the case of an external
entity eavesdropping one or more communication channels between users
and the SP. Note that, in the worst case, the eavesdropper can observe all
the messages that are exchanged in the protocol. Since the same holds for
the SP, the eavesdropper can learn at most what the SP learns.
The techniques we present in this dissertation not only guarantee each
user’s privacy requirement against these two adversary models, but also they
are able to give some privacy guarantees in the case of a set of colluding
buddies. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.6.
In both adversary models we assume that the adversary has exactly the
following knowledge:
• the protocol,
• the spatial granularities adopted by each user, and
• an a-priori probabilistic distribution of the locations of the users.
The two models differ in the sets of messages received during a protocol
run, and in their ability (defined by the protocol in terms of availability of
cryptographic keys) to decrypt the content of the messages.
The a-priori knowledge of the location of a user A is given by a loca-
tion random variable priA with the probability mass distribution denoted
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P (priA). In other words, as prior knowledge we assume that the location
of a user A follows a known distribution given by the distribution of the
random variable priA. Note that we assume the spatial domain is discrete,
i.e., a countable set of “pixels”.
Let M be the set of messages exchanged between the entities involved
in the service. The adversary can compute the a-posteriori probability dis-
tribution of the location random variable postA as the distribution of the
location of A under the given messages M and the prior knowledge priA:
P (postA) = P (locA|M, priA)
Technically, we may view locA as a uniform random variable over the spatial
domain, i.e., the possible location of A when no knowledge is available.
The condition for privacy preservation is formally captured by Defini-
tion 1.
Definition 1. Given a user A with privacy requirement GA
2, and M the
set of messages exchanged by the proximity service protocol in which A is
participating, A’s privacy requirement is said to be satisfied if
P (locA|M, priA, locA ∈ gA) = P (locA|priA, locA ∈ gA)
for all a-priori knowledge priA and all granules gA of GA.
The above definition requires that the location distribution of user A does
not change due to the messages M , given the a-priori knowledge and the fact
that A is located in gA. Hence, a privacy violation occurs when the adversary
acquires, through the analysis of the protocol messages, more information
about the location of A than allowed by her privacy requirements, i.e., when
the probability distribution of the position of A within the region defined
by granule gA changes with respect to priA.
In the extreme case a user needs complete location privacy with respect
to an adversary, the GA requirement is the top granularity >, and hence gA
2Depending on the considered adversary, this can be either GSPA or G
U
A.
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is the entire spatial domain in the above definition. In this case, the defi-
nition requires P (locA|M, priA) = P (locA|priA), i.e., P (postA) = P (priA)
or no new location information for each user A. In the case GA is not >,
the definition requires that with the additional knowledge of A being in a
granule, the adversary cannot derive anything more (e.g., where within the
granule) from the messages exchanged.
3.3 Privacy preserving techniques
In this section we present our techniques to preserve privacy in proximity
based services.
3.3.1 SP-Filtering , Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt
A first solution to protect users’ privacy is to encrypt the location informa-
tion each user sends to the SP and devising a secure computation method
for obtaining the distance between the users. However, in the applicative
context we are considering, maintaining a shared secret between each pair
of users may involve high costs. A solution that does not require a shared
secret cannot be applied, either, since it would necessarily require the SP to
contact every buddy each time any of the other buddies updates her loca-
tion. This is clearly infeasible due to communication and computation costs
both on the client and the SP sides.
In the solutions we present in this section, we consider a hybrid approach
in which a secure computation is performed only after a filtering step based
on obfuscated locations. More precisely, we present three different privacy
preserving protocols, the first of which is called SP-Filtering and does not
involve any communication between the buddies to evaluate their proximity.
The other two, named Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt , provide a more accurate
estimation of the proximity by using SP-Filtering as the first step followed
by a refinement step involving buddy-to-buddy communication. Hide&Crypt
implements this last step with a secure computation. These solutions do
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not require users to share a secret with each other, and hence they could
be applicable to both “contact-list based” and “query driven” category of
proximity services. In this section we illustrate the protocols and their formal
properties. Section 3.3.2 presents the analysis of the protocols presented in
this section.
The SP-Filtering protocol
SP-Filtering is a three-party protocol that computes the proximity of B to A
with a certain approximation, guaranteeing the satisfaction of the minimum
location-privacy requirements of both A and B.
The idea of the algorithm is that when a user A performs a location
update, instead of providing her exact location to the SP, she sends a gener-
alized location that is computed as a function of GUA and the granule G
SP
A (i)
where A is located. More precisely, A sends to SP the location LA(i) that
is computed as the union of the granules of GUA that intersects with G
SP
A (i).
Formally:
LA(i) =
⋃
i′∈N|GUA(i′)∩GSPA (i)6=∅
GUA(i
′)
Each buddy B does the same when location is updated with LB(j) simi-
larly defined, where j is the index such that the location of B is in GSPB (j).
Then, the SP can compute, for each buddy B of A, the minimum and maxi-
mum distance between any two points of LA(i) and LB(j). We denote with
mindist and maxdist the minimum and maximum distance, respectively.
Given mindist and maxdist , the SP can try to answer whether B is in the
proximity of A or not. Indeed, if maxdist < δA, then B is in the proximity
of A, independently from where exactly A and B are located within LA(i)
and LB(j), respectively. Figure 3.1(a) shows an example of this situation.
In this case, the SP sends the “B is in proximity” message to A. On the
contrary, if mindist > δA, then the SP can conclude that B is not in the
proximity of A. Figure 3.1(b) graphically shows that this happens when,
no point of LB is in the proximity of A. In this case, the SP sends the
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“B is not in proximity” message to A (or stays silent depending on the
service requested by A). Finally, if none of the two cases above happen (i.e.,
mindist ≤ δA ≤ maxdist), then the SP is not able to compute whether B is
really in the proximity of A or not. See Figure 3.1(c) for an example: if A is
located close to the top right corner of LA(i) and B is located close to the
bottom left corner of LB(j), then B is in the proximity of A, otherwise he is
not. However, since the SP does not know where A and B are located within
the granules LA(i) and LB(j), respectively, it cannot precisely evaluate the
proximity in terms of δA and sends the “B is possibly in proximity” message
to A.
(a) B is in proximity of
A
(b) B is not in proximity of
A
(c) B is possibly in proximity
of A
Figure 3.1: Regions LA and LB
The Hide&Seek protocol
The main limitation of the SP-Filtering protocol is that, in order to protect
the privacy of user C, granularity GSPC should be coarse. However, if G
SP
C
is coarse, in many cases the SP in not able to compute whether a user is
in the proximity, i.e., the case depicted in Figure 3.1(c). To address this
problem, we now present the Hide&Seek protocol. The idea is that a user C
can provide the SP with coarse location information and in case the SP is
not able to determine the proximity with respect to another user, then the
two users can run a two-party protocol to compute the proximity.
The two-party protocol is straightforward: A sends to B the values i′ and
δA where i
′ is the index of the granule of GUA where A is located. Since G
U
A
3.3. Privacy preserving techniques 48
is public, B can obtain it, for example from the SP. Then, B can compute
d′ as the minimum distance between any two points of GUA(i
′) and GUB(j
′)
where GUB(j
′) is the granule where B is located. If d′ > δA, then B sends
to A the message “B is not in proximity”. Otherwise, B can possibly be in
proximity of A; In this case B sends to A the message “B is in proximity”.
Note here, the conclusion that “B is in proximity” is an approximate one
as this can be wrong if δA distance is strictly judged. This is a necessary
imprecision due to privacy protection, and we take this imprecision as one
performance measure of privacy protection techniques, as it will be shown
in Section 4.1.
Protocol 2 Hide&Seek
Prerequisites: A andB are running the SP-Filtering protocol. A is located
in GUA(i
′), B is located in GUB(j
′).
Protocol:
1: A receives “B is possibly in proximity” from the SP
2: A sends to B “starting two-parties protocol 〈i′, δA〉”
3: B computes: d′ = mindist(GUA(i
′), GUB(j
′))
4: if (d′ ≥ δA) then
5: B sends to A “B is not in proximity”
6: else
7: B sends to A “B is in proximity”
8: end if
Note that the computation run by B during the Hide&Seek protocol
is similar to the computation executed on the SP during the SP-Filtering
protocol. The main difference is that, in this case, the location of A and B
are generalized to the granularities GUA and G
U
B, respectively. In this case,
B has more chances to be able to compute whether A is in the proximity, if
granularities GUA and G
U
B are “finer-than” G
SP
A and G
SP
B , respectively. In this
view, the SP-Filtering protocol has the role of preventing A from starting
the two-parties protocol with B, when not strictly necessary, hence reducing
computation and communication overheads.
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The Hide&Crypt protocol
The Hide&Seek solution requires that exactly the maximum tolerable amount
of location information is revealed each time a users initiates the two-parties
computation. That is, the protocol does guarantee the minimum privacy re-
quirements, but it does not do more in terms of privacy protection. As men-
tioned in the introduction, in addition to the minimum privacy requirements,
a user would prefer to reveal as little information as possible about their lo-
cation. In order to address this problem, we now present the Hide&Crypt
protocol.
Similarly to the Hide&Seek , the Hide&Crypt is composed of two sub-
protocols: the SP-Filtering protocol and a two-parties protocol between
two users. The difference with respect to the Hide&Seek protocol is that
the two-parties proximity problem is solved through a secure computation
protocol. The main idea is that, when the SP-Filtering protocol cannot
determine the proximity of B for A, A will compute the set S of granules of
GUB such that, if B is contained in any of these granules, then B is possibly
in the proximity of A. To test if B is indeed located in any granule of S,
A can run the set-inclusion secure-computation protocol with B and hence
to conclude if B is possibly in proximity (a solution to the secure two-
parties set-inclusion problem was proposed in [31]). A technical issue of this
protocol is that if B knows the cardinality of S he can be able to infer some
location information about A. For example, on a grid-based granularity, it
can happen that the number of granules considered in proximity when the
user is located at the center of a granule is different to the case in which the
user is located close to the corner of a granule. For this reason, the protocol
we propose is an extension of the secure two-parties set-inclusion problem
in which the cardinality of the set S is kept secret too.
More precisely, Hide&Crypt works as follows. First, A computes the set
S′ of indexes of granules of GUB that intersects with the circle C centered in
the location of A with radius δA. Then, in order to hide to B the cardinality
of this set, A creates a new set S by adding to S′ some negative numbers.
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The aim of negative numbers is to increase the cardinality of S without
affecting the result of the computation. The cardinality of S should be
increased so that it is as large as the number sMax(GUB, δA) that represents
the maximum number of granules of GUB that intersect with any circle with
radius δA. Note that sMax(G
U
B, δA) can be computed off-line since its values
depends only on GUB and δA. Then, A encrypts all the elements of S with
a encryption function3 E∗ and a private key KA and sends the result to B.
User B encrypts again, using his private key KB, each element in the set he
receives and sends it back to A together with the encryption of the index j
such that B is located in GUB(j). Finally, A encrypts again E
∗
KB
(j) using the
key KA and checks if the result is contained in E
∗
KB
(E∗KA(S))
4. Encryption
function E∗ is such that E∗KA(E
∗
KB
(j)) ∈ E∗KB (E∗KA(S)) if and only if j ∈ S.
Since negative numbers are not valid indexes, j ≥ 0, and hence j ∈ S if and
only if j ∈ S′. Therefore A computes whether B is in her proximity or not.
3.3.2 Analysis of SP-Filtering , Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt
protocols
SP-Filtering
Proposition 1 formally states the location privacy provided by the SP-
Filtering protocol.
The correctness of this formal result is based on an additional condi-
tion about the granules of GSPA and G
U
A that we require beyond the basic
definitions of the spatial granularities. The condition is formally stated as
∀g ∈ GSPA , h ∈ GUA g ⊆ h or h ⊆ g or h ∩ g = ∅ (3.2)
In other words, if a granule of GSPA and a granule of G
U
A have an intersection,
then either the former totally contains the latter or vice versa. Since we
3Our results hold for any commutative encryption function such that, given two keys
KA and KB and two values i and j, E
∗
KA
(E∗KB (i)) = E
∗
KB
(E∗KA(j)) if and only if i = j.
4 We denote with E∗K(S) the encryption of each element of the set S. Formally,
E∗K(S) =
⋃
i∈S E
∗
K(i). Note that E
∗
K(S) is a set and, hence, its elements are not ordered.
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Protocol 3 Hide&Crypt
Prerequisites: A and B are running the SP-Filtering protocol. User A
knows GUB, a private key KA, the circle C centered in A’s location with
radius δA, and the value sMax(G
U
B, δA). B knows a private key KB, and
the granule GUB(j) where B is located.
Protocol:
1: A receives “B is possibly in proximity” from the SP.
2: A computes: S′ = {j ∈ N s.t. GUB(j) ∩ C 6= ∅}
3: A computes: S′′ as a set of sMax(GUB, δA)− |S′| random negative num-
bers.
4: A computes: S = S′ ∪ S′′
5: A sends “starting two-parties protocol E∗KA(S)” to B
6: B sends 〈E∗KB (E∗KA(S)), E∗KB (j)〉 to A
7: A computes: E∗KA(E
∗
KB
(j))
8: if (E∗KA(E
∗
KB
(j)) ∈ E∗KB (E∗KA(S))) then
9: A computes that B is in proximity
10: else
11: A computes that B is not in proximity
12: end if
assume a granularity “covers” the entire spatial domain, (i.e., the union of
the granules of one granularity is the whole area), for each granule GUA(j),
there exists granule GSPA (i) such that they intersect, and furthermore, if
condition (3.2) is satisfied, it must be the case that one of two granules
totally contains the other. A sufficient condition to satisfy condition (3.2)
is that either GSPA is a finer than G
U
A or vice versa
5.
When two users A and B run the SP-Filtering protocol, the SP learns the
region LA(i) and LB(j) where the two users are located, but cannot exclude
any location of these regions as possible location for A and B, respectively.
5The finer-than relationship was defined for temporal granularities (see, among others,
[8]) and it can be easily extended for spatial granularities. Basically, GSPA is a finer than
GUA if the former is a finer partitioning of the space than the latter is.
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When the SP-Filtering protocol is used to compute the proximity of B with
respect to A, B does not receive any message and hence he does not acquire
any information about the location of A. Vice versa, A can acquire some
information about the possible location of B, depending on the message A
receives from the SP. Proposition 1 formalizes the location knowledge that
A acquires about B.
Proposition 1. Let A be located in GSPA (i) and
Sin = {j ∈ N|maxdist(LA(i), LB(j)) ≤ δA}
Sout = {j ∈ N|mindist(LA(i), LB(j)) ≥ δA}
Whenever the SP-Filtering protocol is used to compute the proximity of B
with respect to A:
1. if A receives the “B is in proximity” message from the SP, then A can-
not exclude that B is located in any location of Area inF =
⋃
j∈Sin LB(j);
2. if A receives the “B is not in proximity” message from the SP, then A
cannot exclude that B is located in any location of AreaoutF =
⋃
j∈Sout LB(j);
3. if A receives the “B is possibly in proximity” message from the SP, then
A cannot exclude that B is located in any location of AreaNoFilter =
(Area inF ∪AreaoutF )C .
In Theorem 1 we prove that the SP-Filtering protocol guarantees to
protect the minimum location privacy requirements. The idea of the proof
is that for each participating user C, LC(i) covers at least one granule of
GUC and one of G
SP
C .
Theorem 1. Let C be a user participating in the SP-Filtering protocol. The
minimum privacy requirements of C are guaranteed.
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The computation complexity of the SP-Filtering protocol on the client
and SP sides depends on the complexity of the operations applied on gran-
ularities (the computation of LC(i) on the client side for user C, and the
computation of mindist and maxdist on the SP side). In Section 4.1 we
describe a class of spatial granularities for which these computations can be
executed in constant time. In terms of communication cost, SP-Filtering
requires each user to issue a message to the SP for each location update
and the SP to issue a message to a user each time the proximity status with
respect to any of her buddies needs to be updated.
Hide&Seek
Whenever a user A runs the two-parties part of the Hide&Seek protocol to
compute if B is in her proximity, the SP does not acquire any additional in-
formation about the locations of A and B. However, A acquires information
about B and vice versa. Proposition 2 formalizes the location information
A acquires about B and that B acquires about A.
Proposition 2. Let A be located in GUA(i
′) and
S′out = {j′ ∈ N|mindist(GUA(i′), GUB(j′)) ≥ δA}
Whenever the Hide&Seek protocol is used to compute the proximity of B
with respect to A:
1. if A receives the “B is not in proximity” message from B, then A can-
not exclude that B is located in any location of AreaoutS = AreaNoFilter∩⋃
j′∈S′out G
U
B(j
′);
2. if A receives the “B is in proximity” message from B, then A cannot
exclude that B is located in any location of Area inS = AreaNoFilter ∩
(AreaoutS )
C ;
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3. B cannot exclude that A is located in any location of AreapassiveS =
GUA(i
′).
Proposition 2 guarantees what user A can deduce on the position on B
based on the messages A receives from B, and vice versa. Figure 3.2 may
help in the understanding of the location privacy guarantees provided by the
Hide&Seek protocol. User A receives the message “B is in proximity” or “B
is not in proximity” from the SP when B is in close proximity (Area inF ) or is
far away (AreaoutF ), respectively. If the SP is not able to compute whether
B is in proximity of A, then A can infer that B is located in AreaNoFilter
(Areain ∪ Areaout in Figure 3.2). More precisely, in this case, if A receives
the message “B is not in proximity” or “B is in proximity” from B then A
can deduce that B is located in Area inS (Area
in , in Figure 3.2) or AreaoutS
(Areaout , in Figure 3.2), respectively.
Figure 3.2: Possible locations of B
Theorem 2 proves that the Hide&Seek protocol guarantees the minimum
location privacy requirements.
Theorem 2. Let C be a user participating in the Hide&Seek protocol. The
minimum privacy requirements of C are guaranteed.
The computational complexity of the Hide&Seek protocol is the same
as the SP-Filtering protocol since the computation of mindist has the same
complexity of the computation of d′. Hence, using the class of spatial gran-
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ularities we present in Section 4.1, the computation can be executed in con-
stant time. For what concerns the communication cost of the protocol, in
addition to the messages required by the SP-Filtering protocol, Hide&Seek
requires each user to exchange two messages of constant size with another
user each time the two-parties computation is run. In Section 4.1 we evaluate
the number of these messages in our experimental setting.
Hide&Crypt
Similarly to the Hide&Seek protocol, also in Hide&Crypt the SP acquires
no information about the location of A and B when the two-parties part is
run. Proposition 3 formally states the information that A acquires about
B and that B acquires about A when the Hide&Seek protocol is used to
compute the proximity of B with respect to A.
Proposition 3. Let B be located in GSPB (j), C be the circle centered in the
location of A with radius δA and
S′ = {j′ ∈ N|GUB(j′) ∩ C 6= ∅}
S′sp = {i ∈ N|mindist(LA(i), LB(j)) <
< δA < maxdist(LA(i), LB(j))}
Whenever the Hide&Seek protocol is used to compute the proximity of B
with respect to A:
1. if A can compute that B is in proximity as the result of the secure
computation protocol with B, then A cannot exclude that B is located
in any location of Area inC = AreaNoFilter ∩ (
⋃
j′∈S′ G
U
B(j
′));
2. if A can compute that B is not in proximity as the result of the secure
computation protocol with B, then A cannot exclude that B is located
in any location of AreaoutC = AreaNoFilter ∩ (Area inC )C ;
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3. B cannot exclude that A is located in any location of AreapassiveC =⋃
i∈S′sp LA(i).
The idea of the privacy protection guaranteed by Hide&Crypt is similar
to the one of Hide&Seek and is graphically depicted in Figure 3.2. In this
case, Areain and Areaout correspond to Area inC and Area
out
C , respectively.
There are two main differences with respect to Hide&Seek . First, as we mo-
tivate and experimentally observe in Section 4.1, Area inC is generally smaller
than Area inS and hence Area
out
C is generally larger than Area
out
S (we recall
that Area inS ∪ AreaoutS = AreaNoFilter and Area inC ∪ AreaoutC = AreaNoFilter ).
Second, while AreapassiveS is the exact granule of G
U
A where A is located,
AreapassiveC is a coarser area that generally covers several granules of G
U
A.
In Section 4.1 we show, through our experimental results, that Hide&Crypt
provides on average more privacy protection than Hide&Seek . With Theo-
rem 3, we formally guarantee that Hide&Crypt provides the minimal location-
privacy requirements.
Theorem 3. Let C be a user participating in the Hide&Crypt protocol. The
minimum privacy requirements of C are guaranteed.
The computational complexity of the Hide&Crypt protocol is the same as
the SP-Filtering protocol on the SP. On the client, the computational com-
plexity is the same as in the SP-Filtering protocol plus the time required to
encrypt the sMax(GUB, δA) integers. Assuming that the computation of the
SP-Filtering can be performed in constant time, like in our experiments,
and assuming a fixed size of the encryption key, the computational com-
plexity is linear in the size of the data to encrypt i.e, is linear in the size of
sMax(GUB, δA). For what concerns the communication cost, Hide&Crypt re-
quires the exchange the same number of messages as the Hide&Seek protocol
with the difference that each message has a length linear in sMax(GUB, δA).
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3.3.3 Longitude
One problem with Hide&Crypt is that it can lead to high communication and
computation cost for the client when a user requires total privacy with re-
spect to the SP. Indeed, in this case, the two-party subprotocol of Hide&Seek
and Hide&Crypt has to run for every proximity request, as the SP would be
totally excluded from the proximity computation. An empirical analysis of
the costs of this drawback is in Section 4.1.3.
Aiming at reducing system costs, we developed another protocol called
Longitude. This protocol, presented in this section, does not require users
to do any two-party computation, and achieves total privacy with respect
to the SP i.e. the GSPA is set to >, under the assumption that the adversary
has no a-priori knowledge about users’ locations. While this assumption can
be unrealistic when considering the entire world as spatial domain, it can
be reasonable when the service is limited to a smaller area, like a city, and
the adversary does not know the distribution of the users over this area.
Differently from the other solutions, only grid-based granularities having
cells of the same size can be chosen as privacy preference with respect to the
other users. We then use the notation GrUA for the grid selected as privacy
preference by user A.
The protocol
The main steps of the Longitude protocol are the following: each time A
wants to check whether B is in proximity, A runs the encryptLocation pro-
cedure to encrypt the cell cA of Gr
U
A where A is located and sends it to
the SP. Then, the SP sends a message to B requiring a location update. B
runs the encryptLocation procedure to encrypt, using the same key as A,
the cell cB of Gr
U
B where B is located and sends the result to the SP. Since
the SP does not know the key used to encrypt the two cells, it is not able to
acquire any location information about A and B. However, the encryption
function is designed in such a way that the SP, upon receiving a request
from A and an answer from B with cells encrypted with the same key, can
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derive some information about the proximity relationship between A and B.
This is obtained through the computeProximity procedure. The SP sends
this proximity related information in the form of a boolean value to the
requester A who can compute, through the procedure getResult, whether B
is in proximity or not.
The encryption function is such that, if A sends her location cell to
the SP using the same encryption key in different instants and while being
in different cells, and the SP is aware of this, he can possibly learn some
information about the movement of A, and hence about her location. For
this reason, A changes the encryption key each time she communicates her
location cell to the SP. The following is a simple protocol to achieve this, but
many optimizations and different solutions can be devised without affecting
the main results of Longitude. We assume A and B share a secret K; the
actual key used to encrypt the location information is obtained through a
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) with seed K. To compute this
shared secret A and B can, for example, employ a key agreement protocol,
like Diffie-Hellman. An index i is locally stored by A, it is incremented at
each proximity request, and it is used to select the i-th generated key for
the current request. Its value is also included in the proximity request, since
the locations of other buddies will need to be encrypted with a key selected
according to i.
The encryptLocation procedure
The procedure is schematically illustrated as Procedure 4. It is used to issue
requests for proximity as well as to send responses to location requests by
the SP. The inputs are the location l of the user running the procedure,
the grid GrU chosen to protect the privacy of the user, and the seed K,
the parameter lastIndex that takes the value of i (i.e., the index of the last
key generated by the PRNG by the user running the procedure), and the
optional parameter newIndex that is only defined when the procedure is
used to respond to a proximity request issued by another buddy; In this
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case, the value of newIndex is the index of the key used by the issuing
buddy. If the procedure is used to issue a request for proximity, the index
is incremented. If the procedure is used to send a response to a location
request, it first checks if the index used by the buddy issuing the request
has ever been used. If this is the case, using the same index again could
compromise the user’s privacy and the procedure simply terminates, hence
ignoring the request incoming from the SP. Otherwise, the key with this
index is generated with the PRNG.
The next steps consist in assigning to variable ki the value of the i-th
number generated by the PRNG with seed K and in computing the cell c
of the grid GrU where the user running the procedure is currently located.
This cell is then encrypted using the encryption function E, described in
the following, and the key ki. Finally, the result is sent to the SP together
with the value of i and the value of i is stored so that it can be used in the
next run of the procedure.
Procedure 4 encryptLocation
Input: a location l, a grid GrU , the seedK, the value lastIndex , the optional
value newIndex .
Procedure:
1: if (issuing request for proximity) then
2: i = lastIndex + 1
3: else {responding to a proximity request}
4: if (newIndex ≤ lastIndex ) then return
5: i = newIndex
6: end if
7: ki is the i-th number generated by the PRNG with seed K
8: c is the cell of GrU that contains the location l
9: c′ = Eki(c)
10: send 〈i, c′〉 to the SP.
11: store i {for the next execution}
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Before describing the encryption function, we first introduce some nota-
tion. In our approach we assume that users are moving in a bi-dimensional
space W which consists in a rectangular grid of sizex × sizey points. For
each point p ∈ W , we denote with px and py the projection of p on the x
and y axis, respectively.
The encryption function E we propose is based on a “modular transla-
tion”. The idea is to apply, to each point of c, a translation followed by a
modulus operation in such a way that no point is moved outside W . For
example, if a point is moved by the translation right above the top boundary
of W , the modulus operation moves it right above the bottom boundary of
W and hence still within W (see Figure 3.3(a)).
The translation shift value is represented by α = 〈αx, αy〉 which is com-
puted from the key ki as follows: αx = ki mod sizex, αy = ki mod sizey.
The encryption function Eki is then specified as:
Eki(cA) =
⋃
p∈cA
〈(px + αx) mod sizex, (py + αy) mod sizey〉
In practice, c′A = Eki(cA) is computed by applying a transformation to
each point of cA. On the x axis, the transformation consists in shifting
the point by αx and then in applying the module sizex. On the y axis the
transformation is analogous. It is worth noting that, depending on α and
cA, Eki(cA) could be a set of contiguous points (see Figure 3.3(b)) as well
as a set of non-contiguous points (see Figure 3.3(c))
The computeProximity procedure
The computeProximity procedure (see Procedure 5) is run by the SP when
it receives two locations encrypted with the same key.
The first step of the procedure consists in computing the “minimum
modular distance” between c′A and c
′
B as follows:
mmd(c′A, c
′
B) = min
p∈c′A,p′∈c′B
moddist(p, p′)
where moddist is the modular distance between p and p′. Intuitively, the
modular distance is the Euclidean distance computed as if W were “circular”
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(a) Translation of a
point
(b) Contiguous points (c) Non-contiguous
points
Figure 3.3: Examples of modular translations of a point and of a cell. Eki(c)
represented in gray.
Procedure 5 computeProximity
Input: 〈i, c′A〉 received from A, which issued a proximity request, and 〈i, c′B〉
received from B, which is responding to the request.
Procedure:
1: dist = mmd(c′A, c
′
B) {minimum modular distance}
2: send A the boolean value (dist ≤ δA)
on both axes. For example, consider two points p and p′ (see Figure 3.4(a)),
with the same horizontal position such that p is close to the top boundary of
W and p′ is close to the bottom boundary. The Euclidean distance of the two
points is about sizey while the modular distance is close to zero. The same
holds on the other axis (see Figure 3.4(b)) and also on the combination
on the two axis (see Figure 3.4(c)). Formally, given two points p and p′,
∆x = |px − p′x| and ∆y = |py − p′y|, the modular distance is defined as:
moddist(p, p′) = min(
√
(∆x)2 + (∆y)2,
√
(sizex −∆x)2 + (∆y)2,√
(∆x)2 + (sizey −∆y)2
√
(sizex −∆x)2 + (sizey −∆y)2 )
The final step of computeProximity consists in comparing the minimum
modular distance between c′A and c
′
B with δA, the proximity threshold of A.
The boolean value of this comparison is sent to A.
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(a) On the vertical axis (b) On the horizontal
axis
(c) On both axis
Figure 3.4: Examples of modular distance
The getResult procedure
In the getResult procedure (see Procedure 6) user A, which is running the
procedure, decides whether B is in proximity or not. This result is obtained
considering the boolean value received from the SP and the relative position
of the cell cA, where A is located, with respect to a region called “certainty
region” of A. This region, denoted by CRA, is the set of points of W that
are farther than δA from the boundaries of W (see Figure 3.5).
The correctness of the result computed by the getResult, as well as the
approximation introduced by the protocol and its safety are discussed in
Section 3.3.4.
Figure 3.5: Example of the certainty region CRA
3.3.4 Analysis of the Longitude protocol
In this section we first discuss the safety of the Longitude protocol with
respect to privacy protection and then we analyze its correctness and the
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Procedure 6 getResult
Input: The boolean value res received from the SP, the cell c where the
user running the procedure is located, the certainty region CR of the user
running the protocol, the user B which responded to the proximity request.
Procedure:
1: if (res = True AND c ⊆ CR) then
2: B is in proximity
3: else
4: B is not in proximity
5: end if
approximation it introduces. We first introduce a formal proposition that
will be used in the protocol analysis.
Proposition 4. Given two cells cA and cB and a key ki, the encryption
function E is such that:
mmd(cA, cB) = mmd(Eki(cA), Eki(cB))
Proposition 4 intuitively states that the encryption function E presented
in Section 3.3.3 does not alter the minimum modular distance between cA
and cB.
Safety
We first analyze the privacy that the Longitude protocol provides to a user
with respect to another buddy and with respect to the SP under the as-
sumptions that the SP and the buddies do not collude. Then, we discuss
the location information that is disclosed in case collusion occurs.
During the execution of the protocol the only message that A receives
containing information related to the location of a buddy B is the boolean
value received from the SP as a response to A’s request for the proximity
of B. When A receives True from the SP (i.e., mmd(c′A, c
′
B) ≤ δA), due
to Proposition 4, A learns that B is located in a cell cB of GB such that
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mmd(cA, cB) ≤ δA. Since A knows cA and GB, she can compute the set of
cells where B is possibly located. Formally, A cannot exclude B is located in
any cell c of GB such that mmd(cA, c) ≤ δA. Analogously, when A receives
False from the SP A cannot exclude B is located in any cell c of GB such
that mmd(cA, c) > δA. Consequently, the minimum privacy requirement of
B with respect to A are guaranteed.
For what concerns the privacy protection with respect to the SP, it is
easily seen from the protocol that the SP only learns the minimum modular
distance between c′A and c
′
B and hence, due to Proposition 4, the minimum
modular distance between cA and cB. This knowledge does not disclose any
explicit location information about A and B. It should be noted, however,
that the SP learn a relative information about the location of A and B,
that is a value related to the distance among their cells. Hence, in case
the adversary has an a-priori knowledge of users location, it may be able
to exclude some portion of the spatial domain as a possible location of the
users. Therefore, Definition 1 is not satisfied by Longitude with respect to
the SP.
We now turn to consider collusion. If a user B considers all buddies
as untrusted, he will probably use the same (coarse) grid for everybody.
In this case, even if buddies collude, the minimum privacy requirements
are guaranteed. However, if user B has different degrees of trust on her
buddies (hence using different grids), and these buddies collude, the location
of B could be discovered with high precision by intersecting the location
information about B acquired by the colluding buddies. This can be easily
avoided by imposing the following constraint on the relationship among the
spatial grids used as privacy preferences: cells from different grids never
partially overlap. In this case, the location of B is never disclosed with a
precision higher than the finest grid among those defined for the colluding
buddies. In other words, the minimum privacy requirement defined for the
most trusted buddy among the colluding ones is guaranteed. Collusion with
the SP is not likely in the service model we are considering, since the SP is
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considered untrusted, while a certain degree of trust is assumed among the
participating buddies that indeed share a secret. In the worst case in which
the trust model is broken by a buddy A of B colluding with the SP, the SP
can obtain and share with A the cell cB where B is located each time B sends
this information encrypted with the secret seed K shared with A. Note that
the minimum privacy requirement with respect to A is guaranteed, and that
the SP can only obtain the same location information about B available to
A.
Service Precision
We now discuss the correctness of Longitude in terms of the service precision
it provides. If A receives False from the SP then, according to the com-
puteProximity procedure, mmd(c′A, c
′
B) > δA. Due to Proposition 4, this
means that mmd(cA, cB) > δA. Since mmd(cA, cB) is a lower bound to the
real distance between A and B, it is guaranteed that B is not in proximity
of A. Vice versa, if A receives True, it is not possible for A to conclude
that B is in proximity, since two forms of approximation are introduced.
We now explain the reason for these approximations, and our choice for the
conditions under which the protocol declares B’s proximity.
One form of approximation, which we call the modular-shift error is
due to the fact that the encryption function does not preserve the distance.
Indeed, as shown in Figure 3.6(a), it can happen that, while c′A is close to
c′B, cA is far from cB. This would imply that, when the SP sends True
to A (i.e., mmd(c′A, c
′
B) ≤ δA) A does not actually know whether B is in
proximity or not. However, it can be easily seen that when cA is in the
certainty region CRA, mmd(cA, cB) ≤ δA implies that mindist(cA, cB) ≤
δA. In this case A can exclude the modular-shift error. Consequently, A
knows that mindist(cA, cB) ≤ δA and considers B as in proximity whenever
True is returned by the SP, and cA is contained in CRA (lines 1-2 of the
getResult procedure). If True is returned but cA is not contained in CRA,
then A cannot conclude that B is in proximity. As we shall see in our
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experimental results, this case is very rare and, as a practical and efficient
solution, procedure getResult returns in this particular case B as not being
in proximity. Clearly, this leads to some possible false negative responses.
A technical solution to avoid this approximation at some extra cost is to
apply a P2P protocol between A and B, whenever this case arises [36].
(a) modular-shift error (b) Cell approximation
Figure 3.6: Two forms of approximation introduced by the Longitude Pro-
tocol.
The second form of approximation, which we call cell approximation, is
due to the fact that B may not be in proximity of A even if mindist(cA, cB) ≤
δA. Figure 3.6(b) shows an example of this situation. The consequence of
cell approximation is that, even if A knows that mindist(cA, cB) ≤ δA, she
cannot be sure whether d(loc(A), loc(B)) ≤ δA. Nevertheless, in this case A
assumes B to be in proximity. This can lead to some false positive cases. In
our experimental evaluation we show that for many practically useful grids
GA and GB, cell approximation only minimally affects quality of service.
3.3.5 C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash
In this section we present two protocols to preserve location privacy in
proximity-based services called C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash. Like Lon-
gitude, these solutions are completely centralized, in order to reduce com-
putation and communication costs for the users, especially with respect to
the Hide&Crypt when conservative privacy preferences with respect to the
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SP are required i.e. the GSPA is set to >. Differently from Longitude, these
protocols can guarantee total privacy with respect to the SP even if the SP
has a-priori knowledge about the users location, and the users can choose
arbitrary granularity GUA as privacy preferences, instead of grids.
In order to ensure user’s privacy, the two protocols adopt symmetric
encryption techniques. In the following, we assume that each user A has a
key KA that is shared with all of her buddies and is kept secret to every-
body else. Hence, each user A knows her own key KA and one key KB for
each buddy B. Since we are considering a contact-list-based service, this
key exchange is assumed to be performed with any secure method before
running our protocols. An example of key exchanging protocol is provided
in Section 4.2.
For the sake of presentation, we decompose each protocol into two parts:
the location update sub-protocol is used by a user to provide her location
information, while the proximity request sub-protocol is used by a user to
compute the proximity of her buddies. The location update sub-protocol is
almost the same in both of our proposed solutions. What really distinguishes
C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash is the proximity request sub-protocol, and
these sub-protocols are described later in this section. We conclude this
section with a discussion about possible technical extensions.
The location update sub-protocol
The location update sub-protocol is run by a user to provide location infor-
mation to the SP. In particular, it defines how a user A provides to the SP
the encrypted index of the granule of GUA where she is located.
Before describing the sub-protocol, we first discuss when it should be run.
Consider the following naive policy: a user A updates her location only when
she crosses the boundary between two granules of GUA, reporting the index of
the new granule. It is easily seen that, independently from how the location
update is performed, each time this message is received, the adversary learns
that A is very close to the border between two granules, excluding many
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other locations, and hence violating the privacy requirements. Intuitively,
the problem of the above policy is that the probability that a location update
is performed at a given time depends on the location from where the message
is sent.
The solution we propose is the following: time is partitioned into update
intervals and an approximate synchronization on these intervals among the
participating nodes is assumed.6 Each update interval has the same duration
T and is identified by an index. Each user has a value t in [0, T ) and
sends exactly one location update during each update interval after that
time t elapses from the beginning of the interval (see Figure 3.7). It is
easily seen that, by using this update policy, the location updates are issued
independently from the location of the users.
Figure 3.7: Location update policy and generation of single-use keys.
We now describe how the location update sub-protocol works. User A
first computes the index i of the granule of GUA where she is located. Then, A
encrypts i using a slightly different technique in the two proposed solutions.
In the C-Hide&Seek protocol a symmetric encryption function E is applied,
while in the C-Hide&Hash protocol a hashing function H is used. When
applying the hashing function H, in order to prevent brute-force attacks, a
secret key is used as a “salt”, i.e., a secret key is concatenated to i, and the
resulting value is given as input to H. In the following, we refer to this salt
6In our current implementation, all the messages sent from the SP to the users contain
the timestamp of the SP, allowing clients to synchronize their clocks using a Lamport-style
algorithm. The overhead due to this solution is negligible. Other forms of global clock
synchronization could also be used as, e.g., using GPS devices.
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as the “key” used to hash i, and we denote with HK(i) the hashing of the
value i with key K.
The safety of the protocols depends on the fact that the key used to
encrypt or hash i is changed at every use. At the same time, we need the
key to be shared by a user with all of her buddies. While other techniques
can be adopted to achieve this result, our solution is the following: the key
KA that A shares with all of her buddies is used to initialize a keystream.
When user A issues a location update, she computes the key Kui as the ui-th
value of this keystream, where ui is the index of the current update interval
(see Figure 3.7). Since each user issues a single location update during
each time interval, this solution ensures that every message is encrypted
or hashed with a different key. Finally, A sends to the SP the message
〈A, ui, EKui(i)〉 if running C-Hide&Seek , and 〈A, ui,HKui(i)〉 if running C-
Hide&Hash. The SP stores this information as the last known encrypted
location for A. Figure 3.8 shows the message sent from A to the SP by the
C-Hide&Seek protocol.
Figure 3.8: Location update sub-protocol in C-Hide&Seek .
Proximity request with C-Hide&Seek
The proximity request sub-protocol is run by a user that wants to discover
which of her buddies are in proximity. In the C-Hide&Seek protocol, this
sub-protocol works as follows: When A wants to discover which buddies are
in proximity, she sends a request to the SP. The SP replies with a message
containing the last known encrypted location of each buddy of A. That is,
for each buddy B, A receives a tuple 〈B, ui, EKui(i)〉. Since A knows KB
and the index ui is in the message, she can compute the value Kui used by
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B to encrypt his location, and hence she can decrypt EKui(i). Finally, since
A also knows GUB, by using i, she obtains the granule gB = G
U
B(i) where B
is located. A can then compute the distance between her exact location and
gB, and compare it with δA, finally determining the proximity. Figure 3.9
shows a graphical representation of the sub-protocol.
Figure 3.9: Proximity request sub-protocol in C-Hide&Seek .
Note that we are now considering the proximity between a point and a
region. In this section, we consider that a point and a region are in proxim-
ity, with respect to a distance threshold, if the minimum distance between
the two objects is less than the threshold. Since, in our protocol, the region
represents the area where a user B is possibly located, this interpretation
of proximity means that there is a possibility for users A and B to actu-
ally be in proximity. The same minimum distance interpretation has been
used in related work on privacy-aware proximity computation. Alternative
interpretations and their effects are discussed in Section 3.3.6.
The C-Hide&Seek protocol provides a simple and efficient solution that,
as will be shown in Section 3.3.6, completely hides the location of the users
to the SP, and that also guarantees the privacy requirements with respect
to the buddies. However, it reveals exactly the maximum tolerable amount
of location information (gB for user B) to any buddy issuing a proximity
request. Even if their privacy requirements are guaranteed, users would
probably prefer to disclose as little information as possible about their loca-
tion when not strictly needed. For example, is there an alternative solution
that does not reveal to a user A the granule information of a buddy B if he
is not in proximity?
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In the next section we present the C-Hide&Hash protocol that provide
such a solution and, in general, ensures a higher level of privacy. This is
achieved at the cost of higher computation and communication costs, as
explained in Section 3.3.6.
Proximity request in C-Hide&Hash
The C-Hide&Hash protocol has two main differences with respect to C-
Hide&Seek . The first difference is that a hash function H is used during
the location update, instead of the encryption function. This is due to the
requirement in this protocol to avoid revealing the relationship between two
plaintext values (the granule indexes) by observing the relationship among
the corresponding encrypted values (see Section 3.3.6 for a more detailed
explanation). Since in this protocol we do not need to decrypt the result
of the function, but we only need to check for equality of encrypted values,
hashing can be used. As specified in Section 3.3.5, each location update
in C-Hide&Hash from user A to the SP is a message containing the tuple
〈A, ui,HKui(i)〉.
Figure 3.10: Computation of granules of GUB considered in proximity by A
The second and main difference with respect to C-Hide&Seek is the
computation of the proximity request sub-protocol. The intuition is that
when A issues a proximity request, she computes, for each of her buddies B,
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the set of indexes of granules of GUB such that, if B is located in any granule
of the set, then B is in proximity (see Figure 3.10). Then, if B provides the
granule in which he is located, it is possible to reduce the proximity problem
to the set-inclusion problem, by checking if that granule is included in the
set computed by A. We want to do this set inclusion without revealing to
A which of the candidate granules actually matched the granule of B.
More precisely, the computation of a proximity request in the C-Hide&Hash
protocol works as follows. When a user A issues a proximity request, she
starts a two-party set inclusion protocol with the SP. The protocol is a se-
cure computation, and consequently the SP does not learn whether A is in
proximity with her buddies, and A only learns, for each of her buddies B,
whether B is in proximity or not, without learning in which granule B is
located. The secure computation exploits a commutative encryption func-
tion E∗. In addition to the keys used in the C-Hide&Seek protocol, at each
proximity request, the requesting user and the SP each generates a random
key that is not shared with anyone else. We denote these keys K1 for user
A and K2 for the SP.
The proximity request sub-protocol is divided into three steps, whose
pseudo-code is illustrated in Protocol 7. In Step (i), user A computes, for
each buddy B, the set S′ of indexes of granules of GUB such that, if B is
located in one of these granules, then B is in proximity. More formally,
A computes the set of indexes i such that the minimum distance mindist
between the location of A and GUB(i) is less than or equal to δA. Then,
in order to hide the cardinality of S′, A creates a new set S by adding to
S′ some non-valid randomly chosen indexes (e.g., negative numbers). This
is done to increase the cardinality of S without affecting the result of the
computation. The cardinality of S is increased so that it is as large as the
number sMax(GUB, δA), already introduced in Section 3.3.1, that represents
the maximum number of granules of GUB that intersect with any circle with
radius δA. Note that sMax(G
U
B, δA) can be computed off-line since its values
depend only on GUB and δA. In the following, when no confusion arises, we
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Protocol 7 C-Hide&Hash: proximity request
Input: User A knows, the last completed update interval, and the proximity thresh-
old δA. Also, for each of her buddy B, A knows the granularity G
U
B , the key KB
and the value of sMax(GUB , δA).
Protocol:
(i) Client request from A
1: proxReq = ∅
2: generate a random key K1
3: for each buddy B of A do
4: S′ = {j ∈ N s.t. mindist(locA, GUB(j)) ≤ δA}
5: S′′ = a set of sMax(GUB , δA)− |S′| non-valid random indexes.
6: S = S′ ∪ S′′
7: Kui is the ui-th value of the keystream initialized with KB
8: ES =
⋃
i∈S E
∗
K1
(HKui (i))
9: insert 〈B, ui, ES〉 in proxReq
10: end for
11: A sends proxReq to the SP
(ii) SP response
1: proxResp = ∅
2: generate a random key K2
3: for each 〈B, ui, ES〉 in proxReq do
4: ES′ =
⋃
e∈ES E
∗
K2
(e)
5: retrieve 〈B, ui, hB〉 updated by B at update interval ui
6: h′ = E∗K2 (hB)
7: insert 〈B,ES′, h′〉 in proxResp
8: end for
9: SP sends proxResp to A
(iii) Client result computation
1: for each 〈B,ES′, h′〉 in proxResp do
2: h′′ = E∗K1 (h
′)
3: if h′′ ∈ ES′ then
4: A returns “B is in proximity”
5: else
6: A returns “B is not in proximity”
7: end if
8: end for
use sMax as a short notation for sMax(GUB, δA). In Line 8, each element
of S is first hashed using the key Kui, which is obtained as the ui-th value
generated by the keystream initialized withKB. In this case ui is the index of
the update interval preceding the current one. Then, the result is encrypted,
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using the commutative encryption function E∗ and key K1 that is randomly
generated. The element composed by the set ES computed in Line 8, B,
and ui is then added to the set proxReq.
Once the operations in Lines 4 to 9 are executed for each buddy B, the
set proxReq is sent to the SP.
Upon receiving proxReq, the SP starts Step (ii). For each tuple 〈B, ui, ES〉
in proxReq, the SP encrypts with the E∗ function each element of ES using
key K2, which is randomly generated. The result is the set ES
′. Then, it
retrieves the tuple 〈B, ui, hB〉 updated by B at the update interval ui. In
this tuple, hB is the value of the index of the granule of G
U
B where B is
located, hashed with the key Kui. Since ui is the update interval preceding
the current one, our location update policy assures that a location update
with update interval ui has already been issued by every buddy B. Finally,
the SP encrypts hB with the commutative encryption function E
∗ using key
K2. The resulting value h
′ is added, together with B and ES′, to the set
proxResp.
Once the computations at Lines 4 to 7 are executed for each buddy B,
the set proxResp is sent to A.
In Step (iii), given the message proxResp received from the SP, A com-
putes the proximity of her buddies. For each tuple 〈B,ES′, h′〉, A obtains
h′′ as the encryption of h′ with E∗ and the key K1 and checks if the result
is in ES′. If this is the case, then B is in proximity, otherwise he is not.
More formally, h′′ ∈ ES′ if and only if the granule of GUB with index i
containing B is in S′, that is equivalent to B being in proximity. Indeed,
for each buddy B, we recall that:
h′′ = E∗K1(E
∗
K2(hB))
and
ES′ =
⋃
i∈S
(E∗K2(E
∗
K1(HKui(i)))
Consequently, due to the commutative property of the encryption function,
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h′′ ∈ ES′ if and only if
hB ∈
⋃
i∈S
HKui(i)
Since hB and the elements of the set are hashed using the same key K
ui,
hB is in the set if and only if i ∈ S. Since S = S′ ∪ S′′ and i 6∈ S′′ (because
S′′ contains invalid integers only while i is a valid integer) then i ∈ S if and
only if i ∈ S′. By definition of S′, this implies that B is in proximity.
Figure 3.11 shows the messages exchanged during the proximity request
sub-protocol of C-Hide&Hash.
Figure 3.11: Proximity request sub-protocol in C-Hide&Hash.
Contrasting velocity attacks and other background knowledge
It is easily seen that our location update policy, based on fixed length update
intervals, makes the probability that a location update is issued independent
from the location from where it is issued. This is an important property used
in Section 3.3.6, together with others, to prove the safety of our solutions
under the adversary models we consider.
Clearly, if the adversary had arbitrary background knowledge, there
would not be any technique that could guarantee privacy. However, it is
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interesting to consider some other forms of knowledge that the adversary
could use. With respect to previous proposals, our defenses are resistant
to an important type of background knowledge: a-priori distribution of the
users’ locations. There are, however, other types of knowledge that may be
interesting to consider as, for example, the time-dependent a-priori location
knowledge. This includes knowledge on the relative position of users at a
certain time, as well as a-priori probability of user movements. With this
kind of knowledge it is also possible to perform attacks based on the velocity
of users. Consider Example 5.
Example 5. User A sends two location updates in two consecutive update
intervals i and j from granule g1 and g2, respectively. Her buddy B issues
a proximity request in each update interval and discovers the granule where
A is located. So far, no privacy violation occurred for A. However, if B
knows that A moves at most with velocity v, then he can exclude that A is
located in some locations l of g2. Indeed, B knows that the temporal distance
between the two location updates of A is equal to the length T of the update
period. Now B can exclude that A is located in any location l of g2 such that
the time required to move from any point of g1 to l with velocity v is larger
than T . Hence B violates the privacy requirement of A.
The problem in Example 5 arises when the adversary knows the max-
imum velocity of a user. Velocity-based attacks have been recently con-
sidered independently from proximity services [19], but the application of
those solutions in our framework would lead to the release of some location
information to the SP. In the following we show how to adapt our location
update policy to provide protection preserving our privacy properties in the
specific case in which the adversary knows the maximum velocity v of a user.
Let tMax(g1, g2) be the maximum time required to move at velocity v
from each point of granule g1 to each point of granule g2. The problem of
Example 5 arises when the temporal distance between two location updates
issued from two different granules g1 and g2 is less then tMax(g1, g2). The
problem can be solved by imposing that A, after entering g2, randomly re-
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ports g1 or g2 as the granule where she is located until time tMax(g1, g2)
elapses from the last location update in g1. This solution is a form of tem-
poral generalization as it adds uncertainty to the adversary, about when the
user crosses the border between g1 and g2. More specifically, the adversary
is unable to identify the exact instant in which the user crossed the border in
a time interval of length at least tMax(g1, g2). Consequently, by definition
of tMax(g1, g2), the adversary cannot exclude that A moved from any point
of g1 to any point of g2.
The extension of our defense techniques to other forms of background
knowledge is one of the subjects for future work.
3.3.6 Analysis of C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash protocols
The main goal of our techniques is to guarantee the satisfaction of users’
privacy requirements under the given adversary models. In the Privacy
subsection, we prove that our two protocols have this property.
However, there are other important parameters to be considered in an
evaluation and comparison among protocols that satisfy the privacy require-
ments. In general, the higher the privacy provided by the protocol, the better
is for the users; since location privacy in our model is captured by the size
of the uncertainty region, in the Size of uncertainty region subsection we
consider this parameter.
A second parameter to be considered is service precision. The percentage
of false positives and false negatives introduced by a specific protocol must
be evaluated. This is considered in the Service precision subsection.
Last but not least, it is important to evaluate the overall system cost,
including computation and communication, with a particular attention to
client-side costs. This is considered in the System costs subsection.
The proofs of the formal results presented in this section are in Ap-
pendix A.
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Privacy
We analyze the privacy provided by C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash consid-
ering the adversary models presented in Section 3.2 under the no-collusion
assumption, i.e., assuming that the SP does not collude with the buddies
and that the buddies do not collude among themselves. Then, we show the
privacy guarantees provided by the two algorithms in the more general case
of possibly colluding adversaries.
Satisfaction of privacy requirements We first analyze the C-Hide&Seek
protocol. Since the private key KA is only known to A and to the buddies
of A, the SP is not able to decrypt the index of the granule where A is lo-
cated. Analogously, the SP is not able to obtain location information about
A’s buddies and, in particular, does not obtain any information about the
distance between A and her buddies.
We now state a formal property of the C-Hide&Seek that is used in the
formal proof of the above observations.
Lemma 1. The C-Hide&Seek protocol ensures that under any a-priori knowl-
edge priA, the following two random variables are probabilistically indepen-
dent: (1) The binary random variable ur(A): an update/request is sent by
user A, and (2) random variable locA, i.e., the location of A, of any distri-
bution. Formally, we have
P (ur(A)|locA, priA) = P (ur(A)|priA),
for any a-priori location knowledge priA and location random variable locA
for user A.
Note that we are assuming discrete time and discrete location. A con-
tinuous case can be formalized and proved equally easily. Also, this lemma
does not concern the type or content of a message sent by A, but just the
fact that a message is sent by A.
Another property we use to prove our safety result is provided by the
encryption algorithms, via the information theoretical notion of “perfect se-
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crecy” [9]. Intuitively, perfect secrecy for an encryption algorithm means
that given ciphertext c, each plaintext p has the same probability to be en-
crypted to c (posterior), with a randomly chosen key, as the probability of
p to be used in the first place (prior). That is, P (p|c) = P (p). Equivalently,
given plaintext p, each ciphertext c has the same probability to be the en-
cryption of p (posterior), with a randomly chosen key, as the probability of
c to appear in the first place as ciphertext (prior). That is, P (c|p) = P (c).
Applied to our situation, when SP receives a message 〈A, ui, EKui(l)〉, since
Kui is hidden from the SP and can be chosen arbitrarily, the probability
that SP receives any other message of the form 〈A, ui, EKui(l′)〉 is the same.
Most of practical encryption algorithms do not have the theoretical per-
fect secrecy, but use computational hardness to achieve secrecy in the sense
that it is computationally very hard (or impractical) to derive the plaintext
from the ciphertext. Intuitively, P (p|c) = P (p) holds because c does not
yield any information about p. Therefore, we use the simplifying, practical
assumption that the encryption methods we use do give us perfect secrecy.
The above perfect secrecy discussion applies to single messages. When
dealing with multiple messages, correlation between plaintexts may reveal
secrets when the same key is used. This is the classical scenario of repeated
key use problem, and one solution to this problem is to use so-called one-
use-pad or keystreams as we do in our proposed protocols. As each key
is only used once, encrypted messages are independent to each other when
perfect secrecy is assumed.
From the above discussion and assumptions, Lemma 2 follows. Since
the lemma involves random variables on messages, we need to specify the
message space for these variables. We consider the randomness of the mes-
sages to be on the encrypted part, while other parts are fixed. Formally,
we call each sequence 〈B, ui1〉, . . . , 〈B, uin〉, where B is a user and uij is a
time interval, a (message set) type. (Recall that a message is of the form
〈B, ui, ES〉.) The messages of the same type differ on the encrypted part of
the messages and constitute a message space. When a generic message M
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is mentioned, we assume it is a variable over all the messages with a specific
type.
Lemma 2. Given messages M = M1 ∪ M2 issued in the C-Hide&Seek
protocol, where M1 ∩M2 = ∅, we have
P (M |locA, priA) = P (M1|locA, priA) ∗ P (M2|locA, priA),
for all a-priori knowledge priA and location locA for user A.
With Lemma 1, perfect secrecy, and Lemma 2, we now show a main
result, namely, the SP does not acquire any location information as a conse-
quence of a location update or a proximity request using the C-Hide&Seek
protocol. The following formal results implicitly refer to our adversary mod-
els that, in particular, assume that the SP has no background knowledge
other than the protocol, the a-priori distribution, and the granularities.
Theorem 4. Let A be a user issuing a sequence of location updates and
proximity requests following the C-Hide&Seek protocol. Then, A’s privacy
requirement is satisfied with respect to the SP.
We now turn to the location information acquired by the buddies. In
the C-Hide&Seek protocol, a user A issuing a proximity request does not
send any location information, hence her buddies, even if malicious, cannot
violate her privacy requirements. When the same user runs the location
update subprotocol in C-Hide&Seek , her buddies can only obtain the granule
at the granularity GUA in which A is located. As a consequence, the privacy
requirement of A is guaranteed. This is formally stated in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. Let A be a user issuing a sequence of location updates and
proximity requests following the C-Hide&Seek protocol. Then, A’s privacy
requirement is satisfied with respect to each of A’s buddies.
We consider now the C-Hide&Hash protocol. Since KA is only known
to A and her buddies, the SP is not able to acquire the location information
provided by A during a location update. This follows from Theorem 4.
3.3. Privacy preserving techniques 81
The difference of the C-Hide&Hash from the C-Hide&Seek is that when A
issues a proximity request in C-Hide&Hash, an encrypted message is sent
to the SP. However, due to the property of the secure computation protocol
in C-Hide&Hash, the only information that the SP acquires about the set
provided by A is its cardinality. Actually, the cardinality of this set is
always sMax(GUB, δA) that, by definition, depends only on δA and G
U
B, and
not on the actual location of A or B. Consequently, the SP does not acquire
any information about the location of A and B, including their distance.
Theorem 6 formally states this property.
Theorem 6. Let A be a user issuing a sequence of location updates and
proximity requests following the C-Hide&Hash protocol. Then A’s privacy
requirement is satisfied with respect to the SP.
Similarly to the C-Hide&Seek protocol, in C-Hide&Hash each buddy of
A can only obtain location information derived from A’s location update.
It is worth noting that in the C-Hide&Seek protocol, each time B issues
a proximity request, he obtains the granule of GUA where his buddy A is
located. Differently, using the C-Hide&Hash protocol, B only gets to know
whether the granule where A is located is one of those in SA. This means
that, if A is not in proximity, then B only learns that A is not in any of the
granules of SA. Otherwise, if A is in proximity, B learns that A is in one of
the granules of SA, without knowing exactly in which granule she is located.
This is formally stated in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Let A be a user issuing a sequence of location updates and
proximity requests following the C-Hide&Hash protocol. Then, A’s privacy
requirement is satisfied with respect to each of A’s buddies.
In Section 4.1 we show that, on average, C-Hide&Hash provides more
privacy with respect to the buddies than C-Hide&Seek , but at extra costs,
making each protocol more adequate than the other based on user prefer-
ences and deployment modalities.
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Privacy in case of possibly colluding adversaries We now consider
the case in which our reference adversaries can collude, and we analyze the
privacy guarantees of the C-Hide&Hash and C-Hide&Seek protocols in this
scenario.
First, consider the case in which two buddies B and C collude to violate
the privacy of a user A. The problem can be easily extended to consider
more buddies. Let lB be the set of possible locations of A obtained by B as a
result of a proximity request. Let lC be the analogous information acquired
by C during the same update interval. Since B and C collude, they can
derive that A is located in lB ∩ lC . However, due to Theorem 7, given GUA(i)
the granule where A is located, it holds that lB ⊇ GUA(i) and lC ⊇ GUA(i)
(recall that GUA is the privacy requirement of A with respect to the buddies).
Consequently, lB ∩ lC ⊇ GUA(i) and hence the privacy requirement of A is
guaranteed also in the case B and C collude.
Now, consider the case in which the SP colludes with one or more bud-
dies. For example, if one of the buddies shares the secret key KA with the
SP, the SP can learn the granule where A is located. In this case, the privacy
requirement of A with respect to the SP is not guaranteed. Nevertheless,
even if the SP knows KA, he cannot discover the location of A within the
granule of GUA(i) where A is located. This is because, by the definition of the
two protocols, every message issued by A does not depend on the location of
A within GUA(i). Consequently, the privacy requirement with respect to the
buddies is still guaranteed. This means that the lowest privacy requirement
of the two colluding entities is preserved and this is the best that can be
achieved in case of collusion.
Service precision
The techniques proposed in the literature as well as the techniques we pro-
pose in this dissertation, generalize the location of one of the two users to an
area. When proximity is computed, the exact location of that user within
the area is not known. Hence, proximity is evaluated as the distance between
3.3. Privacy preserving techniques 83
a point and a region.
Consider how it is possible to compute the proximity between a user A
whose exact location is known and a user B whose location is only known
to be in region. It is easily seen that if the maximum distance between the
point and the region is less than the proximity threshold, then the two users
are in proximity, independently from where B is located within the region.
Figure 3.12(a) shows an example of this situation. On the contrary, if the
minimum distance is larger than the distance threshold, then the two users
are not in proximity. Figure 3.12(b) graphically shows that this happens
when no point of the region containing B is in proximity of A. If none of
the two cases above happen (i.e., the threshold distance is larger than the
minimum distance and less than the maximum distance), we are in presence
of an uncertainty case, in which it is not possible to compute whether the
two users are in proximity without introducing some approximation in the
result. For example, Figure 3.12(c) shows that if B is located close to the
bottom left corner of the region then B is in the proximity of A, otherwise
he is not.
(a) B is in proximity of
A
(b) B is not in proximity
of A
(c) B is possibly
in proximity of
A
Figure 3.12: Different cases of proximity between a point and a region
The choice we made in the presentation of our protocols is to consider
two users as in proximity in the uncertainty case. The rational is that in
this case it is not possible to exclude that the users are not in proximity.
The other solutions presented in this chapter, as well as previous approaches
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( [53]) facing a similar issue have adopted the same semantics.
One drawback of this minimum-distance semantics is that it generates
false positive results and this may be undesirable in some applications. In-
deed, if user B is reported to be in proximity of A, then A may decide to
contact B (e.g., through IM). This may be annoying for B, if he is not actu-
ally in proximity. Consider, for example, the case in which the location of B
is reported at the granularity of a city: B is always reported as in proximity
of A when A is in the same city, independently from the proximity threshold
chosen by A.
An alternative semantics, that we name maximum-distance semantics,
solves this problem. The idea is to consider two users as in proximity only
when it is certain that they are actually in proximity. This happens when the
maximum distance between their areas is less than the distance threshold.
While this approach does not generate any false-positive, it does produce
false-negatives. The two semantics above have a common drawback: in cer-
tain cases it happens that the probability of providing a false result is larger
than the probability of providing a correct result. Consider the example
depicted in Figure 3.13 in which the minimum-distance semantics is con-
sidered. User B is considered in proximity but the answer is wrong if B is
located in the region colored in gray. Assuming a uniform distribution of
B inside gB, it is much more likely to have an incorrect result, rather than
a correct one. An analogous problem can arise for the maximum-distance
approach.
The percentage of false results can be minimized by considering user B as
in proximity only when at least one half of the area is actually in proximity.
The drawback of this mostly-in-proximity semantics is that it incurs in both
false positive and false negative results.
Our protocols are designed so that it is very easy to change the current
proximity semantics. Since this can be done client-side, without the need for
changes server-side nor in the code other peers are running, the semantics
can be potentially chosen through the user interface at any time.
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Figure 3.13: Approximation incurring with the minimum-distance semantics
We analytically measured the impact of the different semantics on the
accuracy of our protocols by calculating the expected precision and the ex-
pected recall. The expected precision is defined as the probability that a
buddy reported to be in proximity according to a given semantic is actually
in proximity. Vice versa, the expected recall is defined as the probability
that a buddy actually in proximity is reported to be in proximity according
to a given semantic.
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Figure 3.14: Expected precision
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show the minimum expected precision and recall
for the minimum-distance and the maximum-distance semantics. Both mea-
sures depend on the ratio between δ and the area of the granules in which
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Figure 3.15: Expected recall
a user is considered in proximity. For this analysis we considered a grid-like
granularity containing cells having edge of size l and we assume users are
uniformly distributed. As can be observed in Figure 3.14, the maximum-
distance semantic has always precision equal to 1. This is because all the
buddies considered in proximity are always actually in proximity. The mini-
mum-distance has precision of about 1/3 when the values of δ and l are equal,
and this value grows logarithmically when δ is larger than l. The analysis of
expected recall (Figure 3.15) shows that the minimum-distance has always
recall equal to 1. This is because if a buddy is actually in proximity, it is
always reported in proximity using this semantic. The maximum-distance
semantic, on the contrary, has a minimum expected recall equal to 0 when
δ and l are equal. This is because, with this parameters, it can happen that
no cells of size l are fully contained in a circle having radius δ. However,
the recall of the maximum-distance grows more rapidly than the precision
of the minimum-distance.
Size of uncertainty regions
As already discussed in Section 3.3.6, our protocols are proven to always
guarantee the privacy requirement with respect to the buddies. However,
the main difference between our two protocols consists in the fact that C-
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Hide&Hash can provide additional privacy with respect to one buddy. For
example, if a user A issues a proximity request using C-Hide&Hash, and
a buddy B is reported as being not in proximity, A only learns that B is
not located in any of the granules considered in proximity (i.e., the ones
included in S). The resulting uncertainty region of B, in this case, is equal
to the entire space domain minus the region identified by S. When B is re-
ported to be in proximity, A learns that B is located in one of the granules
of S, but not exactly in which of those granules. Therefore, the uncertainty
region in this case is given by the region identified by S. The size of this
region depends on the value δA, on the area of the granules in G
U
B, and on
the distance semantics chosen by A. In order to show how the size of the
uncertainty region is affected by these parameters, we simplify the analy-
sis by considering grid-like granularities, similarly to Section 3.3.6. Each
granularity is a grid identified by the size l of the edge of its cells.
Figure 3.16 shows the additional privacy achieved by C-Hide&Hash for
different values of δ/l. The additional privacy is measured as the lower
bound of the number of granules in S. As can be observed, using both
semantics, the additional privacy grows when δ is larger than l. This means,
for example, that if δ is 5 times larger than l, then the actual size of the
uncertainty region of B is 60 (or 88) times larger than the minimum privacy
requirement if A is using the maximum-distance (or minimum-distance,
resp.) semantics.
System costs
We separately evaluate the computation and communication costs involved
in running the two proposed protocols. The analytical evaluation reported
here is complemented with experimental results in Section 4.1.
C-Hide&Seek In order to perform a location update, a user needs to com-
pute the index of the granule where she is located. The time complexity of
this operation depends on the data structure used to represent granularities.
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Figure 3.16: Privacy with respect to a buddy
As we shall show in Section 4.1, with our implementation of the granularities
this operation can be performed in constant time. The complexity of the
encryption operation depends on the encryption function and on the length
of the encryption key. Considering a fixed key length, the encryption of
the index of the granule can be performed in constant time. Since the SP
only needs to store the received information, the expected computational
complexity is constant. The communication cost is constant and consists in
an encrypted integer value.
For what concerns the cost of a proximity request on the client side, for
each buddy the issuing user needs to decrypt the index and to compute the
distance of the granule with that index from her location. In our imple-
mentation these operations can be performed in constant time and hence
the time complexity of the proximity request operation on the client side is
linear in the number of buddies. On the SP side, the computational cost
to retrieve the last known locations of the buddies is linear in the number
of buddies. The communication consists in one request message of constant
size from the user to the SP, and of one message from the SP to the user
with size linear in the number of buddies.
C-Hide&Hash The cost of a location update operation on the client is
similar to the cost of the same operation using C-Hide&Seek , since the only
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difference is that a hashing function, which can be computed in constant
time, is applied instead of the encryption function. Like in C-Hide&Seek ,
the SP only needs to store the received information. Hence, computational
costs of a location update are constant both for the client and for the SP.
The communication cost is constant, as the only exchanged message consists
in a hashed value.
On the client side, a proximity request from A requires, for each buddy
B, the computation of the granules of GUB which are considered in prox-
imity, the hashing, and the encryption of a number of granule indexes in
the order of sMax(GUB, δA). The value of sMax can be pre-computed for a
given granularity. The computation of the granules considered in proximity
can be performed in constant time in our implementation, using grids as
granularities. The computation of the hashing and the encryption functions
can also be performed in constant time, hence the time complexity of a
proximity request is linear in the number of buddies times the maximum
among the sMax values for the involved granularities. When the client re-
ceives the response from the SP, the result computation performed by A
for each buddy B requires the encryption of a number (the encrypted value
sent by the SP), and the lookup of the encryption in a set of encrypted
values with cardinality sMax(GUB, δA). As the lookup in the set of hashes
requires at most sMax operations, the time complexity is then linear in the
number of buddies times the maximum value of sMax. Hence, this is also
the overall complexity on the client side. On the SP side, the response to a
proximity request from a user A requires, for each buddy B, a) the retrieval
and the encryption of the hashed location of B, b) the encryption of the
sMax(GUB, δA) hashed granule indexes sent by A. As the encryption runs in
constant time, the time complexity is linear in the number of buddies times
the maximum value of sMax.
Regarding the communication costs, both of the messages involved in the
proximity request sub-protocol contain the encryption of a set of a number
of hashed values linear in the number of buddies times the maximum value
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Table 3.1: Parameter values
Query Distance Privacy Privacy System
Protocol driven approximation wrt SP wrt buddies costs
buddies
SP-Filtering X Region-Region Minimum Same as SP Low
required
Hide&Seek X Region-Region Minimum Minimum Average
required required
Hide&Crypt X Point-Region Minimum More than High
required required
Longitude Region-Region Total1 More than Low
required2
C-Hide&Seek Point-Region Total Minimum Low
required
C-Hide&Hash Point-Region Total More than Average
required
1 assuming the adversary has no a-priori knowledge of the locations
2 privacy requirement must be expressed as a grid with cells of the same size
of sMax.
3.4 Comparison of the protocols
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of the characteristics of the protocols presented
in this chapter.
As can be observed, the SP-Filtering , Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt proto-
cols are the only ones that can support services in which the buddies are not
predetermined. However, the system costs of Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt
can significantly grow if the users have strict privacy requirements with
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respect to the SP, as this would require frequent buddy-to-buddy communi-
cations. Among these three protocols, Hide&Crypt achieves a better service
precision due to a more precise distance approximation, and can provide
more privacy than strictly required.
The main advantages of the Longitude protocol are the communication
and computation costs, as it is fully centralized and employs a fast symmetric
encryption function. The drawbacks of this protocol are the lack of privacy
guarantee with respect to the SP, under the assumption that the a-priori
distribution of the location of users is already known, and the constraint
about the privacy preferences with respect to the users to be limited to
grids, instead of arbitrary spatial granularities.
The C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash protocols can achieve a service pre-
cision comparable to Hide&Crypt , with a significant reduction of the system
costs. Both protocols are formally proved to guarantee total privacy with
respect to the SP. In addition, the C-Hide&Hash protocol can achieve more
privacy than strictly required with respect to the buddies, at a relatively low
additional cost in terms of computation and communication. The sustain-
ability of these costs as well as the effective performance in terms of privacy
and quality of service has been empirically verified, and results are reported
in Chapter 4.
The selection of an appropriate protocol to be used depends on the ap-
plicative context and on the requirements of the service. The C-Hide&Seek
and C-Hide&Hash protocols are the solutions that provide the best privacy
guarantees, keeping the costs sustainable both on the client and the server
side. The C-Hide&Seek protocol can also easily be modified to be used as
a location tracking service (like Google Latitude), that is another popular
category of services in the context of GeoSNs. It should be noted that the
C-Hide&Hash protocol may require a large amount of computing resources
when applied to a very large scale of users, compared to the other protocols,
and the resulting cost may be a concern for a small service provider. If this
is case, the Longitude protocol could be a lighter solution, but users should
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be aware of its weakness with respect to an adversary with a-priori knowl-
edge of the locations of the users. Finally, if the applicative context requires
“query-driven” buddies, only the SP-Filtering , Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt
solutions can be applicable.
Chapter 4
Evaluation of the proposed
defenses
4.1 Empirical evaluation
We conducted experiments to measure the performance of our C-Hide&Seek
and C-Hide&Hash protocols, which are our most recent and promising solu-
tions, and to compare them with our Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt protocols
as well as the Pierre and FriendLocator protocols [48, 53]. We present the
experimental setting in Section 4.1.1. Then, in Sections 4.1.2, 4.1.3 and 4.1.4
we evaluate the protocols according to three evaluation criteria: quality of
service, privacy and system costs, respectively.
The experiments reported in this section do not include the Longitude
solution, because it does not fully satisfy Definition 1 with respect to the SP
as explained in Section 3.3.4. We point the reader to the relative publication
for the experiments about this protocol [34].
4.1.1 The experimental setting
The experimental evaluation of the protocols presented in Section 3.3 was
performed on a survey-driven synthetic dataset of user movements, which
was obtained using the MilanoByNight simulation (see Section 2.3.1). We
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carefully tuned the simulator in order to reflect a typical deployment sce-
nario of a proximity service for geo-social networks: 100, 000 potential users
moving between their homes and one or more entertainment places in the
city of Milan during a weekend night. The simulation also models the time
spent at the entertainment places, i.e., when no movement occurs, following
probability distributions extracted from user surveys. All the test results
shown in this section are obtained as average values computed over 1, 000
users, each of them using the service during the 4 hours of the simulation.
Locations are sampled every 2 minutes. The total size of the map is 215
km2 and the average density is 465 users/km2. All the components of the
system are implemented in Java. Server-side test were performed on a 64-bit
Windows Server 2003 machine with 2.4Ghz Intel Core 2 Quad processor and
4GB of shared RAM. Client-side tests were run on a HTC Magic mobile de-
vice, running Android as operating system. We implemented the symmetric
encryption and the hashing functions using the RC4 and MD5 algorithms,
respectively, while the RSA public key encryption algorithm was used for
the key distribution.
In the experiments we used grid-based granularities. Each granularity
is identified by the size of the edge of one cell of the grid. The location-to-
granule conversion operations required by our protocol can be performed in
constant time. For the sake of simplicity, in our tests we assume that all the
users share the same parameters and that each user stays on-line during the
entire simulation. Table 4.1 shows the parameters used in our experiments.
Note that the “number of buddies” parameter refers to the number of on-line
buddies that, for the considered type of application, is usually significantly
smaller than the total number of buddies. The parameter GSPA is set to > for
all protocols i.e. the users require total privacy with respect to the SP. This
parameter could only vary for the Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt protocols,
and its fixed for the other protocols. For the impact of this parameter to
Hide&Seek and Hide&Crypt we point the reader to the paper that presented
these protocols [36].
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Table 4.1: Parameter values
Parameter Values
δ 200m, 400m, 800m, 1600m
Edge of a cell of GUA 100m, 200m, 400m, 800m
Number 10, 20, 40,
of buddies 80
4.1.2 Evaluation of the quality of service
(a) Pierre / FriendLocator (b) Our solutions
Figure 4.1: Examples of the granularity approximation
The first set of experiments evaluate the impact of the techniques on the
quality of service, by measuring the exactness of the answers returned by
each protocol. Indeed, two forms of approximation are introduced by our
protocols. The granularity approximation is caused by the fact that, when
computing the proximity between two users, the location of one of them is
always generalized to the corresponding granule of her privacy requirement
granularity. The other approximation, which we call the time-dependent ap-
proximation, is due to the fact that, when a user issues a proximity request
with C-Hide&Seek , proximity is computed with respect to the last reported
location of each buddy. The approximation is introduced because the bud-
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dies have possibly moved since their last location update. Similarly, during
the computation of a proximity request with C-Hide&Hash, the location
transmitted by each buddy during the previous update interval is used.
For what concerns the granularity approximation, a similar problem oc-
curs with the Pierre and FriendLocator protocols too. Indeed, both pro-
tocols, in order to detect proximity between buddies, partition the domain
space into a grid, with each cell having edge l equal to the distance thresh-
old δ, that must be shared by the users. Then, a buddy B is considered in
proximity of A whether B is located in the same cell as A or in one of the 8
adjacent cells. The approximation introduced by these techniques depends
entirely on the chosen value of δ. Differently, in our solutions, each user
can choose her privacy requirements independently from the value of δ. For
example, consider Figure 4.1. The black dot is the actual location of user
A. The dark gray circle with radius δ is the area where the buddies of A are
actually in proximity of A. The light gray area is the region in which buddies
are erroneously reported to be in proximity1. Considering Figure 4.1(a), as
l is always equal to δ when using Pierre or FriendLocator, the total area of
the 9 cells considered in proximity is 9δ2, while the area of the circle is piδ2,
which is almost 3 times smaller. This means that, assuming a uniform dis-
tribution of the users, using Pierre or FriendLocator the probability that
a buddy reported as in proximity is actually in proximity is about 1/3. On
the contrary, in the protocols presented in this paper the size of the granules
is independent from the chosen δ. In our example, this means that when the
value l is smaller than δ, the region in which users are erroneously reported
in proximity becomes smaller (Figure 4.1(b)).
Figure 4.2(a) shows how the granularity approximation impacts on the
service precision for different values of the edge of granularity cells. The
metric we use for the measurement is the information retrieval notion of
precision: the ratio between the number of correct “in proximity” answers
1Here and in the following, we assume users of our protocols are choosing the minimum-
distance semantics
4.1. Empirical evaluation 97
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 200 400 600 800
P
re
ci
si
o
n
Edge of a cell of G (m)
C-H&Seek/C-H&Hash
Pierre/FriendLoc
(a) Granularity approximation only
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 4 8 12 16 20
P
re
ci
si
on
Time interval (min)
C-Hide&Seek
C-Hide&Hash
(b) Time-dependent approximation only
Figure 4.2: Evaluation of the impact of the approximations
over the total number of “in proximity” answers. Intuitively, the precision
measures the probability that a buddy reported “in proximity” is actually
in proximity. Note that the analysis would be incomplete without con-
sidering the notion of recall : the ratio between the number of correct “in
proximity” answers over the sum of correct “in proximity” and incorrect
“not in proximity” answers. Intuitively, the recall measures the probability
that a buddy actually in proximity is reported “in proximity”. In this case,
since we are considering the minimum-distance semantics (see Section 3.3.6),
the granularity approximation does not produce any incorrect “not in prox-
imity” answer, and hence the recall is equal to 1. When conducting this
experiment, in order to exclude from the evaluation the effects of the time-
dependent approximation, for each buddy we used his current location as
the last reported location. Since Pierre and FriendLocator do not consider
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GUA, their precision is constant in the chart and, as expected, is below 0.4.
On the contrary, C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash have a significantly bet-
ter precision when the edge of the cells of GUA is small. Intuitively, this is
because the area where a buddy is erroneously reported as in proximity is
smaller than δ (see Figure 4.1(b)). Figure 4.2(a) also shows the precision
when the edge of a cell of GUA is larger than δ; The values are not reported
for Pierre and FriendLocator since in this case they do not guarantee the
privacy requirements.
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Figure 4.3: Evaluation of the quality of service (considering both approxi-
mations)
Figure 4.2(b) shows the impact of the time-dependent approximation.
The chart shows the results for our protocols only, as the other protocols pro-
posed in the literature are not exposed to this kind of approximation. In or-
der to exclude from this evaluation the effects of the granularity approxima-
tion, we performed these tests with the exact locations of the users, instead
of the generalized ones. The chart shows, on the x axis, different lengths of
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the update interval and, on the y axis, the precision of the C-Hide&Seek and
C-Hide&Hash protocols. It can be observed that C-Hide&Seek has better
precision. This is due to the fact that C-Hide&Hash always uses the location
reported during the previous update interval, while Hide&Seek uses the last
location, that can be the one reported during the current update interval or
during the previous one. Since the time-dependent approximation also in-
troduces incorrect “not in proximity” answers, we also measured the recall.
The corresponding chart is omitted as it is almost identical to the one in
Figure 4.2(b). For example, using C-Hide&Hash and an update interval of
4 minutes, the value of the precision is 0.89 and the recall is 0.88.
The computation of the precision and recall under the time-dependent
approximation confirms the intuition that using long update intervals nega-
tively impacts on the quality of service. The choice of a value for the update
interval should consider, in addition to this approximation, the cost of per-
forming a location update. In general, the optimal value can be identified
based on specific deployment scenarios. Considering our movement data, we
chose 4 minutes as a trade off value since it guarantees precision higher than
0.9 and sustainable system costs as detailed in Section 4.1.3. Our choice is
consistent with similar proximity services like, for example, Google Latitude
that currently requires location updates every 5 minutes.
Figure 4.3 shows the analysis of the quality of service considering both
the granularity and time-dependent approximations. Figure 4.3(a) shows
the precision of C-Hide&Hash and C-Hide&Hash protocols compared with
the precision of Pierre and FriendLocator. We represent the precision of C-
Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash with a single curve because the two protocols
behave similarly. For example, when the edge of a cell of GUA is 200m, the
precision of C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash is 0.59 and 0.57, respectively,
while it is 0.61 for both protocols when the time-dependent approximation
is not considered. This shows that this second type of approximation does
not have a significant impact.
Figure 4.3(b) shows the recall of our protocols. Note that Pierre and
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FriendLocator do not lead to incorrect “not in proximity” answers, and
hence their recall is equal to 1. On the contrary, our protocols can generate
incorrect “not in proximity” answers due to the time-dependent approxima-
tion. This chart shows that the recall of C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash
is always above 0.95 and 0.9, respectively. From Figure 4.3(b) we can also
observe that the recall increases for coarser granularities. This is due to the
fact that less incorrect “not in proximity” answers are returned if a coarser
granularity is used. While this may appear unreasonable, the explanation is
straightforward: there is an incorrect “not in proximity” answer only when
a buddy is currently in proximity (considering Figure 4.1(b), his location
is in the dark gray area) while the location used in the computation of the
proximity is outside the light gray area. If a granularity is coarse, then
the light gray area is large and hence incorrect “not in proximity” are less
frequent.
Figure 4.3(c) shows the accuracy for each considered protocol, i.e., the
percentage of correct answers. Also in this case, the accuracy of C-Hide&Seek
and C-Hide&Hash is represented with a single curve, as the two protocols
behave similarly. Comparing this figure with Figure 4.3(a), we can observe
that the accuracy achieved by all the protocols is much higher than the pre-
cision. This is due to the fact that this metric also considers the correct “not
in proximity” answers that are usually the most frequent answers, since the
proximity query area determined by the distance threshold is usually much
smaller than the entire space. Figure 4.3(c) shows that our protocols achieve
better accuracy than Pierre and FriendLocator when the value of the edge
of the granularity cells is smaller than δ. In particular, for our default values,
the accuracy of both C-Hide&Seek and C-Hide&Hash is higher than 0.99.
4.1.3 Evaluation of the system costs
The second set of experiments evaluates the computation and communica-
tion costs of the different protocols. For the analysis of the Pierre protocol,
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Figure 4.4: Evaluation of the system costs
we used the NearbyFriend2 application, developed by the same authors,
which integrates the Pierre protocol in a desktop IM application.
First, we consider the costs related to the location update sub-protocol.
This analysis does not apply to existing solutions as location updates are
only required by our centralized solutions. As analyzed in Section 3.3.6,
the temporal complexity of computing a location update is constant in the
number of buddies. In our implementation, the computation of each location
update requires, on the client side, about half of a millisecond for both the C-
Hide&Seek and the C-Hide&Hash protocols. Similarly, the communication
cost is independent from the number of buddies and the payload of each
2http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software/nearbyfriend/
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location update message consists in few bytes. Considering the overhead
caused by the XML encapsulation, the dimension of each location update is
in the order of a few hundred bytes.
The computation time needed to run a proximity request on the clients
is shown in Figure 4.4(a). Note that the values reported in this figure only
consider the computation time required by the issuing user. Indeed, all the
protocols require the SP (in case of centralized services) or the other buddies
(in case of distributed services) to participate in the protocol, and hence to
perform some computation. For example, in the case of Hide&Crypt and
Pierre, the total computation time of a user’s buddies to answer a proximity
request issued by that user is about the same as the computation time
required to issue the request. As observed in Section 3.3.6, the computation
time of a proximity request is linear in the number of buddies. Figure 4.4(a)
shows that C-Hide&Hash requires significantly more time with respect to
C-Hide&Seek , especially when the number of buddies is large. For example,
the time needed to issue a proximity request for 40 buddies is about 20 ms
for C-Hide&Seek , while about 900 ms using C-Hide&Hash. The figure also
shows that the computation times of C-Hide&Hash and Hide&Crypt are
similar, with Hide&Crypt performing slightly better. This is due to the fact
that in Hide&Crypt each of the sMax indexes only needs to be encrypted,
while in C-Hide&Hash it also needs to be hashed.
For what concerns other existing solutions, we did not implement the
Pierre protocol on our mobile device platform. However, considering the
experimental results presented by the authors (see [53]), the computation
time of a single proximity request with a single buddy is more than 350ms3.
Since, for C-Hide&Hash, the computation time on a mobile device of a
proximity request with a single buddy is about 22ms, according to the data
we have, our solution is at least one order of magnitude more efficient than
the Pierre solution.
Regarding the computation costs on the server side, the complexity of
3It is unclear whether this result is obtained on a mobile device.
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a proximity request using C-Hide&Hash on the server side is similar to the
one on the client side. However, in our experiments we observed that our
high-end desktop machine is about 500 times faster than the mobile client
to execute these operations. As a consequence, the computation for a single
user having 40 buddies requires less than 2ms. While we did not run scala-
bility tests on our server, this result suggests that, from the computational
point of view, even a single desktop machine can provide the service to a
large number of users.
Figures 4.4(b) and 4.4(c) show the system communication cost of a prox-
imity request issued by a user. In Figure 4.4(b) we measure the num-
ber of messages exchanged by the system for each proximity request. It
is easily seen that using a centralized protocol (i.e., C-Hide&Seek and C-
Hide&Hash), only two messages need to be exchanged (one for the request
and one for the response) independently from the number of buddies the
issuer has. On the contrary, the decentralized protocols requires at least
two messages for each buddy. Moreover, in our implementation of the
Hide&Crypt protocol, each communication between two users needs to tran-
sit through the SP. The same applies to the Pierre protocol, using the Near-
byFriend implementation. Consequently, at each location update, for each
buddy, four messages transit in the system: two between the issuer and the
SP and two between the SP and the buddy.
Figure 4.4(c) shows a comparison of the total amount of data exchanged
in the system for each proximity request. Consistently with our analysis,
the communication cost grows linearly with the number of buddies for both
of our centralized protocols. It is easily seen that this also applies to the
other protocols. The chart shows that NearbyFriend incurs in high commu-
nication costs. The reason is that, each time a proximity request is issued,
a message of almost 3KB is sent from the user to each of her buddies and
a message having a similar size is sent back in the reply. We believe that
this overhead is mostly given by the fact that NearbyFriend needs all the
communications between two users to be encapsulated in a secure channel.
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This is required because the Pierre protocol itself does not guarantee that
any third party acquiring the messages cannot derive location information
about the users. Since each message between two users transits through the
server, the communication cost is almost 12KB for each buddy. The other
decentralized solution we compare with, Hide&Crypt , has better communi-
cation costs. Indeed, each message is less than 1KB, and hence the cost is
about 1/4 if compared to Pierre.
Our centralized solutions are even more efficient. This is due to the
fact that only two messages need to be exchanged between the user and
the SP for each proximity request. In case of C-Hide&Hash, each message
has the same dimension than in Hide&Crypt , and hence, in this case, the
communication cost is one half with respect to Hide&Crypt , and about one
order of magnitude less with respect to Pierre. Finally, C-Hide&Seek , in
addition to being a centralized solution, also benefits from the fact that each
message contains only a few hundred of bytes. Consequently, this protocol
is about 4 times more efficient than C-Hide&Hash.
In Figure 4.4(d) we evaluate the communication cost of the continuous
use of a proximity service with our protocols. As mentioned in Section 4.1.2,
we consider that location updates are issued every 4 minutes. Considering
the results of our user survey, we use 10 minutes as the average frequency
of proximity requests. The main difference of this figure with respect to
Figure 4.4(c) is that it also considers the communication costs derived by
the location updates. However, since each location update costs less than 300
bytes, and 15 location updates need to be issued in one hour, the total hourly
cost for this sub-protocol is about 4KB, which is negligible with respect to
the communication cost of the proximity requests. The figure also shows
that the centralized protocols require significantly less communication than
the decentralized ones. In particular, C-Hide&Seek for one hour requires
less than 100KB when the user has 40 online buddies. C-Hide&Hash, on
the other side, requires 400KB per hour for the same number of buddies.
We believe that this cost is largely sustainable on a wireless broadband
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network (e.g., 3G), and that, given the additional privacy with respect to
curious buddies achieved using C-Hide&Hash, privacy concerned users may
find this trade-off attractive.
Our experimental evaluation also included the measurement of the cost
to distribute the private key (see Section 4.2). Both the computation and
communication costs are linear in the number of buddies that need to re-
ceive the new key. For a single buddy, the computation time is about 7ms,
measured on the mobile device, while the communication cost is less than
200 bytes. An experiment of key distribution to 40 buddies, resulted in a
computation time of 275 ms, and a communication cost of 7KB.
4.1.4 Evaluation of the achieved privacy
In Section 3.3.6 we proved that both of our protocols guarantee the users’
privacy requirements. We also observed that that C-Hide&Hash provides
more privacy than what would be strictly necessary to guarantee the re-
quirements. In this last set of experiments we evaluate how much additional
privacy is provided by C-Hide&Hash in terms of the size of the uncertainty
region. We recall that this is the area where a user A is possibly located as
it can be computed by one of A’s buddies after issuing a proximity request
that returns A as in proximity.
Figure 4.5 shows that the privacy provided by C-Hide&Hash is always
significantly larger than the privacy requirement, and it grows for coarser
granularities GUA. Intuitively, with C-Hide&Hash, the uncertainty region
corresponds to the union of the light and dark gray areas represented in
Figure 4.1(b). Consequently, as the size of the cells of GUA decreases, the
size of the light gray area tends to zero, and the uncertainty region becomes
closer and closer to the dark gray area only. This means that the privacy
provided by C-Hide&Hash is at least piδ2 even when the user requires her
location to be obfuscated in a smaller area.
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Figure 4.5: Size of the uncertainty region.
4.2 Implementation of the service
We implemented the techniques presented in Section 3.3 and the Pierre and
FriendLocator solution in a system, called Pcube, that provides proximity
notification coupled with typical instant messaging (IM) functionalities. In
addition to providing this service, the system allows a “live” comparison of
the performance of the different protocols in terms of service precision and
privacy achieved.
The system is built as an extension of XMPP (Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol), an open standard protocol often used in commercial ap-
plications as a message oriented middleware [44]. The choice of extending
XMPP is driven by the following considerations. First, the XMPP protocol
can be easily extended to support custom services and messages, like the
proximity service, in our case. In particular, by extending XMPP messages,
we designed a proper XML protocol for each of our techniques. The system
architecture is shown in Figure 4.6. The SP providing the proximity services
is implemented as a XMPP component (called Proximity component) i.e.,
a pluggable entity that extends the default XMPP functionalities. Hence,
we developed a distinct XMPP component for each technique that requires
algorithms to run on the SP side. A second advantage is that the XMPP
protocol already includes standard sub-protocols for client-to-client commu-
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Figure 4.6: System architecture
nication and for managing the list of buddies. We used these sub-protocols
as primitives in our implementation. Since the XMPP architecture is de-
centralized, clients running on different servers can communicate with each
other. In our case, since a component acts as a special type of client, this
means that our proximity service is accessible to a user registered to an
existing XMPP service, including popular IM services like Google Talk or
Jabber. This makes it possible to use, in the proximity service, the same list
of buddies used in those IM services. Clearly, proximity can be computed
only for those buddies that are participating in the same proximity service.
For what concerns the client, we developed a multi-platform web ap-
plication and an other application specifically designed for Android based
smartphones. In addition to the typical functionalities of an IM application,
the clients implement all the proximity protocols presented in Section 3.3
and provide the typical functionalities of a full-fledged proximity service,
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including the detection of the client user’s location, the notification of any
buddies in proximity, and the graphical visualization of the location un-
certainty region for each buddy. We also developed a monitoring system
that emulates different users using multiple protocols at the same time, and
provides a web interface to control the users and analyze the performances
of the different protocols. A more detailed description of the clients is in
Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
One of the issues emerged during the implementation of the C-Hide&Hash
and C-Hide&Seek protocols concerns key management. Indeed, both pro-
tocols require that each user A has a key KA that is shared with all of her
buddies, and it is kept secret to everybody else. A first problem is how A
can share her key with one buddy B in a secure manner. This operation is
required, for example, when the user accesses the proximity service for the
first time or a new buddy is added to the buddy list. To address this prob-
lem, we employ standard public key cryptography techniques to encrypt,
for each buddy of a user A, the key KA; After being encrypted, the key
can be safely transmitted over an insecure channel. The second problem is
how to revoke a secret key. For example, this is necessary when a buddy
is removed from the buddy list, or when the key is compromised. In our
implementation, in order to revoke a key, it is sufficient to generate a new
secret key and to send it to the authorized buddies.
The cost of sending a key to all the buddies is clearly linear in the number
of buddies. In Section 4.1 we show that the costs to perform this operation
on a mobile device are sustainable. In addition, it should be observed that
the distribution of the key to all the buddies is only needed when a user
first subscribes to the proximity service or when a buddy is removed from
the buddy list. These are very sporadic events during a typical IM service
provisioning.
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(a) Buddy list (b) Menu buttons
Figure 4.7: Android application
4.2.1 Mobile client
The application running on Android uses the platform’s API to acquire the
location and has the main functionalities of the web application. For ex-
ample, Figure 4.7(a) shows the main interface of the application, containing
the two lists of buddies with Alice being in proximity. When the physical
“menu” button is pressed (Figure 4.7(b)), the application shows the options
to update the location, to set the proximity range, to change the settings
and to sign out.
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Figure 4.8: Web application interface (“Map” tab)
4.2.2 Web client
Figure 4.8 shows a screenshot of the web application. All the typical func-
tionalities of an IM application are provided (e.g.: setting a nickname, choos-
ing a picture, changing the availability status). The user can see the address
from where the last location update was sent to the SP and can require to
update her location (using the “update location” link). The application uses
Geolocation API4 to obtain a user’s location directly from the browser. Also,
the user can see and change the distance threshold below which buddies are
considered in proximity (the so called “Proximity Range”). The “Settings”
link brings to an interface that allows a user to change his preferences for
the location updates, the protocols to be used and the privacy preferences
for each protocol, where applicable. In the center part of the interface, there
4http://www.w3.org/TR/geolocation-API/
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are two tabs. The “Chat” tab allows users to communicate each other via
instant messaging. The “Map” tab, which is the one highlighted in this
screenshot, shows on a map a) a red “location-mark” situated where Alice
(the user, in the example) issued the last location update, b) a circle, cen-
tered in Alice’s location, representing the proximity query (the “proximity
range” is 500m in the example) and c) a shadowed rectangle representing
the uncertainty region where the selected buddy (Bob, in the example) is
located.
4.2.3 Monitor application
Figure 4.9: Monitor application interface
We developed a set of tools to visually evaluate the performances of
the different techniques. To perform the evaluation, we simulate multiple
users accessing the service, that can be arbitrarily moved on a map by
using a web-based control application, shown in Figure 4.9. The simulated
users are semi-automatic XMPP clients that accept movement and setting
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“commands” from the monitor, run the proximity protocols and report back
statistics to the monitor. The statistics are then processed and graphically
shown on the screen.
The “Precision” tab shows, for each protocol, the region in which the
buddies of a user are reported in proximity, and the actual proximity region
centered in that user’s location. It is then possible to see interactively how
these regions change with the different parameters, and what would be their
precision in a real-word scenario. The “Privacy” tab reports the effective
uncertainty region achieved by each protocol, letting the evaluator observe
how the regions compare with different parameters. Finally, the “Costs”
tab reports live graphs about the effective traffic generated by the clients
for each different protocol.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and future work
In this chapter we summarize main contributions of this dissertation and we
address problems arising from data privacy preservation in proximity-based
services that still need to be deeply investigated.
5.1 Summary of the contributions
The main goal of this thesis was the analysis of the privacy issues in the
context of location-based proximity services and the proposal of defense
techniques to provide controllable disclosure of location information to the
users.
To perform this analysis, a deep study of the existing privacy preserving
techniques for LBS has been performed, in order to evaluate their applicabil-
ity to this particular context. We presented a formalization of the problem
of location privacy in proximity services, considering both the SP and the
other participants to the service as potential adversary for a user. We pro-
posed a flexible way to express users’ privacy requirements, by letting them
define geographical region in which they do not want to be exactly localized
by a considered adversary.
We proposed five different protocols that are formally proved to enforce
users’ privacy preferences against a well defined adversary model with each
protocol having different characteristics in terms of requirements, perfor-
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mance or privacy guarantees. All the protocols have been theoretical an-
alyzed and the result of the analysis has been confirmed by an extensive
experimental evaluation. The protocols perform better than other solutions
already presented in literature under every performance measure we consid-
ered.
An implementation of our solution was included in a fully functional
instant messaging system that can extend the functionality of existing com-
mercial products with proximity services. The developed tools also allowed
an empirical and visual comparison of the different solutions we proposed,
as well as other solutions presented in literature.
5.2 Future work
Proximity services
An interesting extension of our protocols is to allow users to specify differ-
ent privacy preferences with respect to different groups of buddies. This is
not difficult, but it exposes the users to dangerous collusion attacks if fur-
ther constraints are not imposed. The presented protocols are not subject
to buddies’ collusion attacks since each user defines the same granularity
as privacy preference with respect to all of her buddies. If this is not the
case, a user A, by assigning two different granularities with respect to bud-
dies B and C to reflect her different level of trust, would expect that if B
and C collude the lowest privacy requirement among the two is preserved.
However, an adversary could actually intersect the uncertainty regions and
potentially violate both privacy requirements. In order for our protocols to
defend against such a collusion, some relationships need to be imposed on
the granularities used in the system. While details are out of the scope of
this paper, intuitively, granules from different granularities should never par-
tially overlap. For example, using hierarchical grids as granularities would
be a sufficient condition.
Another direction we plan to investigate is to extend the adversary mod-
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els we considered in this paper to include not only (atemporal) a-priori lo-
cation knowledge, but also time-dependent location knowledge. This would
model not only a-priori knowledge about velocity, that our solutions can
already deal with, but also a-priori probabilistic proximity information. It
is still unclear if the proposed protocols, with appropriate location update
strategies need to be modified in order to be proved privacy-preserving ac-
cording to our definitions.
The design of an entirely decentralized proximity service is another chal-
lenging task. As we have observed, current decentralized solutions can lead
to high computation and communication costs, which is the main reason
why, in our solutions, we involved the SP in the computation of the proxim-
ity. However, we do not exclude that a properly designed decentralized pro-
tocol could provide a location privacy-aware proximity service while keeping
the system costs sustainable.
Privacy in GeoSN
Our current research effort is dedicated to the study of privacy threats for
GeoSN services different from proximity services. In fact, proximity services
only one of the services available to GeoSN users. More precisely they are a
particular subcategory of the friend tracking services, that typically allow a
user to see the location of their buddies on a map regardless of the distance
between them.
Another popular category of GeoSN services is the publication of re-
sources tagged with geo-location. Such resources can be, for example, sta-
tus messages, photos, or “check-ins” and they are tagged with the loca-
tion in which they were generated. Further, resources may reference other
users: for example, this occurs when a user tags a photo with the people in
the photo. Most popular services exploiting GeoSN resources are Facebook
Places, Foursquare, Google Picasa, Flickr, Brightkite, Google Buzz, Google
Latitude, Gowalla, Loopt, Twitter, and Whrrl.
In a recent work [17], which we describe briefly, we analyzed some of the
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privacy threats for users of this category of services and proposed two tech-
niques to preserve privacy while maintaining some utility of the published
data.
The privacy threats we described in Section 3.2.2 for proximity-based
services also apply to the context of resource publishing services. In addi-
tion, we considered the temporal component of the location information as
potentially private. A typical example is a user who elects to not let people
know that he attended a religious ceremony or a political meeting. Another
privacy concern we addressed is absence privacy, that is the uncontrolled dis-
closure of the absence of a user from a geographic position at specific times
can occur. This concern is conceptually different from location privacy and
requires different protection techniques. A typical example is a user not
wishing to let people know that he will not be at home for an extended
period of time, as this information could be used to plan a burglary. Note
that these concerns are amplified in those GeoSNs that allow user-tagging of
geo-localized resources, because the users do not have control about being
tagged in a resource. We proposed a model to let users express their location
and absence privacy preferences, and designed an enforcing mechanism that
employs specific spatial or temporal cloaking techniques, and publication
delay. For further details we point the reader to the relative paper.
As a future work in this field, it would be interesting to investigate a more
flexible way of expressing users privacy preferences, possibly differentiating
their preference for different (groups of) users. Another interesting problem
that deserves a deeper study are the co-location privacy violation [45] i.e.
an adversary obtains to know that two users met in a certain place, which
can be considered a privacy violation if those users do not want to disclose
the fact that they meet.
Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1, we first prove Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Let i, Sin , Sout , Area
in
F , Area
out
F and AreaNoFilter as defined in
Proposition 1. Whenever the SP-Filtering protocol is used to compute the
proximity of B with respect to A:
1. A receives the message “B is in proximity” from the SP, if and only
if B is located in Area inF ;
2. A receives the message “B is not in proximity” from the SP, if and
only if B is located in AreaoutF ;
3. A receives the message “B is possibly in proximity” from the SP, if
and only if B is located in AreaNoFilter ;
Proof. We prove thesis 1. The proof for thesis 2. is analogous. Given thesis
1. and 2., thesis 3. follows trivially.
⇒) If loc(B) ∈ Area inF then A receives the message “B is in prox-
imity” from the SP.
Let j be such that loc(B) ∈ GSPB (j). We now prove that j ∈ Sin . Thesis
follows since, by definition of Sin , maxdist(LA(i), LB(j)) ≤ δA and hence,
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by definition of the SP-Filtering protocol, the SP sends the message “B is
in proximity” to A.
By definition of Area inF , since loc(B) ∈ Area inF , then loc(B) ∈
⋃
k∈Sin LB(k).
By definition of LB, this implies loc(B) ∈
⋃
k′∈S′in G
U
B(k
′) where S′in =⋃
k∈Sin{k′ ∈ N|GUB(k′) ∩GSPB (k) 6= ∅}.
Now, let j′ be the index such that loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′). Since loc(B) ∈⋃
k′∈S′in G
U
B(k
′) and loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′) and since two granules of the same
granularity do not intersect, j′ ∈ S′in .
By Condition 3.2, either GUB(j
′) ⊆ GSPB (j) or GSPB (j) ⊂ GUB(j′).
If GUB(j
′) ⊆ GSPB (j) then it does not exist any other granule of GSPB
except GSPB (j) that intersects with G
U
B(j
′). Hence, by contradiction, j ∈ Sin .
Indeed, if j 6∈ Sin then, by definition of S′in j′ 6∈ S′in , which is absurd.
If GSPB (j) ⊂ GUB(j′) then, by Condition 3.2 and by the fact that each
granularity is a partitioning of the entire spatial domain, there exists a set
S such that GUB(j
′) =
⋃
k∈S G
SP
B (k). Since there exists no other granule of
GSPB except those in S that intersects with G
U
B(j
′), by definition of S′in , there
exists at least one k ∈ S which is also in Sin , otherwise j′ would not be in
S′in , By definition of LB, for each m,n ∈ S, LB(m) = LB(n). In particular,
LB(k) = LB(i). Hence, by definition of Sin , since k ∈ Sin , i ∈ Sin .
⇐) If A receives the message “B is in proximity” from the SP,
then loc(B) ∈ Area inF .
Let j be such that loc(B) ∈ GSPB (j). By definition of the SP-Filtering
protocol, the SP returns “B is in proximity” to A if maxdist(LA(i), LB(j)) ≤
δA. Hence, by definition of Sin , j ∈ Sin . Finally, by definition of LB,
loc(B) ∈ GSPB (j) ⊆ LB(j) and hence, by definition of Area inF , loc(B) ∈
Area inF
We can now prove Proposition 1.
Proof. The thesis follows since, by definition of the SP-Filtering protocol,
if A receives any of the three messages, then A does not receive any other
message. Hence, the thesis follows by Lemma 3.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We first prove that (a) there exists at least one granule of GSPC such
that SP is not able to exclude any location of that granule as possible location
of C. Then we prove that (b) there exists at least one granule of GUC such
that any other buddy D is not able to exclude any location of that granule
as possible location of C.
(a) By assumption, the SP has no information about the location of
C other than the one exchanged during the protocol. Hence, the SP only
knows that C is located in LC(i) where i is the granule of G
SP
C where C is
located. By definition of LC , G
SP
C (i) ⊆ LC(i), hence the SP cannot exclude
any location of GSPC (i) as possible location of C.
(b) By assumption, D has no information about the location of C other
than the one exchanged during the protocol. Hence, by Proposition 1, D
cannot infer any location information about C other than C is located in
Area inF or in Area
out
F or in AreaNoFilter . We now prove, for each of the three
areas, that if C is located in the area, than that area covers at least the
granule GUC(i
′) where C is located.
Area inF and Area
out
F are defined as the union of regions LC which, in turn
are obtained as the union of granules of GUC . Hence, Area
in
F and Area
out
F
are defined as union of granules of GUC . Consequently, by definition, also
AreaNoFilter is the union of granules of G
U
C .
Since, by definition of granularity, two granules of the same granularity
do not overlap, if loc(C) ∈ GUC(i′), then it does not exists any other granule
i′′ 6= i′ such that loc(C) ∈ GUC(i′′). Hence, if loc(C) ∈ Area inF , then, since
Area inF is the union of granules of G
U
C , then G
U
C(i
′) ⊆ Area inF .
The proof is analogous for AreaoutF and AreaNoFilter .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
In order to prove the thesis, we prove that:
(a) A receives the message “B is not in proximity” from B if and only if B
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is located in AreaoutS ;
(b) A receives the message “B is in proximity” from B, if and only if B is
located in Area inS ;
(c) B receives the message “starting two-parties protocol 〈i′, δA〉” if and only
if A is located in GUA(i
′).
Once (a), (b) and (c) are proved, the thesis follows. Indeed, in case A
receives the message “B is not in proximity” from B, by definition of the
Hide&Seek protocol, the only other message that A receives is “B is possibly
in proximity” from the SP. From Lemma 3 the SP sends the “B is possibly
in proximity” message to A if and only if B is located in AreaNoFilter . Hence,
if A receives the message “B is not in proximity” from B, then A cannot
exclude that B is located in any location of AreaoutS ∩ AreaNoFilter . Since
AreaNoFilter ⊆ AreaoutS , then AreaoutS ∩ AreaNoFilter = AreaoutS hence the
thesis. The proof is analogous in the case A receives from B the message
“B is in proximity” or in the case B receives from A the message “starting
two-parties protocol 〈i′, δA〉”.
Case (a) ⇒) If A receives the message “B is not in proximity”
from B then B is located in AreaoutS .
We show that loc(B) ∈ AreaNoFilter and that loc(B) ∈
⋃
k∈S′out G
U
B(k).
Thesis follows by definition of AreaoutS .
By Lemma 3, the SP-Filtering protocol returns the “B is possibly in
proximity” message to A if and only if loc(B) ∈ AreaNoFilter .
By definition of the Hide&Seek protocol, given j′ such that loc(B) ∈
GUB(j
′), B sends the message “B is not in proximity” toA only if mindist(GUA(i
′), GUB(j
′)) ≥
δB. Then, by definition of S
′
out, j
′ ∈ S′out and hence loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′) ⊆⋃
k∈S′out G
U
B(k).
Case (a)⇐) If B is located in AreaoutS , then A receives the message
“B is not in proximity” from B.
Since, by assumption, loc(B) ∈ AreaoutS , then loc(B) ∈
⋃
k∈S′out G
U
B(k).
By definition of S′out, mindist(GUA(i
′), GUB(j
′)) ≥ δA. Hence, by definition of
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the Hide&Seek protocol, the protocol returns the “B is not in proximity“
message.
Case (b) ⇒) If A receives the message “B is in proximity” from
B then B is located in Area inS .
By definition of the Hide&Seek protocol, A receives the the message “B
is in proximity” from B if and only if the SP-Filtering protocol returns “B is
possibly in proximity” and if B does not return the “B is not in proximity”
message. From Lemma 3, it follows that the SP returns “B is possibly
in proximity” if and only if loc(B) ∈ AreaNoFilter . From point (a) above,
it follows that B does not return the “B is not in proximity” message if
and only if loc(B) ∈ (AreaoutS )C . Hence B returns the “B is in proximity”
message if and only if
loc(B) ∈ AreaNoFilter ∩ ((AreaoutS )C = Area inS
Case (b)⇐) If B is located in Area inS , then A receives the message
“B is in proximity” from B.
Since, by assumption, loc(B) ∈ Area inS , by definition of Area inS , loc(B) 6∈⋃
k∈S′out G
U
B(k). By definition of S
′
out, given j
′ such that loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′),
mindist(GUA(i
′), GUB(j
′)) > δA. Hence, by definition of the Hide&Seek pro-
tocol, the protocol returns the “B is in proximity” message.
Case (c) directly follows from the definition of the Hide&Seek protocol.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. During each execution of the Hide&Seek protocol the SP does not
receive any additional information with respect to the execution of the SP-
Filtering protocol. Hence, from Theorem 1, it follows that there exists at
least one granule of GSPC such that the SP is not able to exclude any location
of that granule as possible location of C. We now prove that, for each buddy
D, there exists at least one granule of GUC such that D is not able to exclude
any location of that granule as possible location of C.
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By assumption, D has no information about the location of C other than
the one exchanged during the protocol. While executing the protocol, D can
receive 6 messages:
(a) “C is in proximity” from the SP;
(b) “C is not in proximity” from the SP;
(c) “C is possibly in proximity” from the SP;
(d) “C is not in proximity” from C;
(e) “C is in proximity” from C;
(f) “starting two-parties protocol 〈i′, δC〉” from C.
Given i′ such that loc(C) ∈ GUC(i′), we prove that, for each of these
messages, D is not able to exclude any location of GUC(i
′) as possible location
of C.
For messages (a), (b) and (c), thesis follows from Theorem 1. For mes-
sage (f), thesis follows by the definition of the Hide&Seek protocol.
For message (d), by definition, AreaoutS is the union of granules of G
U
A.
Since, by definition of granularity, two granules of the same granularity do
not overlap, if loc(C) ∈ GUC(i′), then it does not exists any other granule
i′′ 6= i′ such that loc(C) ∈ GUC(i′′). Hence, since loc(C) ∈ AreaoutS , and
Area inF is the union of granules of G
U
C , then G
U
C(i
′) ⊆ Area inF .
The proof is analogous for case (e).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We first prove, in Lemma 4, that the secure computation of the Hide&Crypt
protocol solves the set-inclusion problem.
Lemma 4. Let S′ be a set of positive integers. Let S′′ be a set of negative
integers. Let j be a positive integer. Let E∗ be a commutative encryption
function such that, for each pair of values i and i′ and each pair of key KA,
KB,
E∗KA(E
∗
KB
(i)) = E∗KB (E
∗
KA
(i′))⇔ i = i′
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Let KA, KB be two keys. Then,
E∗KA(E
∗
KB
(j)) ∈ E∗KB (E∗KA(S′ ∪ S′′))⇔ j ∈ S′
Proof. By defintion,
E∗KA(E
∗
KB
(j)) ∈ E∗KB (E∗KA(S′ ∪ S′′))
m
E∗KA(E
∗
KB
(j)) ∈
⋃
j′∈(S′∪S′′)
E∗KB (E
∗
KA
(j′))
By assumption about E∗, if j is in S′ ∪ S′′, then E∗KB (E∗KA(j)) is in⋃
j′∈(S′∪S′′)E
∗
KB
(E∗KA(j
′)). Vice versa, if E∗KB (E
∗
KA
(j)) is in
⋃
j′∈(S′∪S′′)E
∗
KB
(E∗KA(j
′)),
then j is in S′ ∪ S′′. Hence
j ∈ (S′ ∪ S′′)⇔ E∗KB (E∗KA(j)) ∈
⋃
j′∈(S′∪S′′)
E∗KB (E
∗
KA
(j′))
Since, by assumption, j is positive and S′′ contains negative elements
only, j 6∈ S′′,
j ∈ S′ ⇔ j ∈ (S′ ∪ S′′)
Hence the thesis.
We can now prove Proposition 3.
Proof. Thesis 3. follows from the fact that, by the definition of the Hide&Crypt
protocol, A sends a “starting the secure two parties protocol” only when
the SP cannot compute whether B is in the proximity of A. The SP cannot
compute whether B is in the proximity of A if and only if A is located in
AreapassiveC (the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3).
In order to prove thesis 1. and 2., we show that:
(a) A can compute that B is in proximity as the result of the secure com-
putation protocol with B if and only if B is located in Area inC ;
(b) A can compute that B is not in proximity as the result of the secure
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computation protocol with B if and only if B is located in AreaoutC The the-
sis follows since, A initiates the secure two parties computation only if the
SP is not able to compute whether B is in proximity of A. From Lemma 3
the SP is not able to compute whether B is in proximity of A only when
loc(B) ∈ AreaNoFilter . Hence, if A can compute that B is in proximity as the
result of the secure computation protocol with B, then from result (a) above
A cannot exclude that B is located in any location of AreaNoFilter ∩Area inC .
The thesis follows since, by definition of Area inC , AreaNoFilter ⊆ Area inC .
The proof is analogous in case A can compute that B is not in proximity
as the result of the secure computation protocol with B.
We prove case (a). Case (b) follows since if A starts the two-parties pro-
tocol, then B must be in AreaNoFilter and Area
out
C = AreaNoFilter∩(Area inC )C .
⇒) If A can compute that B is in proximity as the result of the
secure computation protocol with B then loc(B) ∈ Area inC . We show
that loc(B) ∈ AreaNoFilter and loc(B) ∈
⋃
k∈S′ G
U
B(k).
By Lemma 3, A initiates the two-parties protocol only if loc(B) ∈
AreaNoFilter .
Given j′ such that loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′) since A can compute that B is in
proximity, then j′ ∈ S′. Hence loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′) ⊆
⋃
k∈S′ G
U
B(k).
⇐) If loc(B) ∈ Area inC then A can compute that B is in proximity
as the result of the two-parties computation
Since, loc(B) ∈ Area inC ⊆ AreaNoFilter , from Lemma 3, it follows that A
initiates the secure computation with B. If loc(B) ∈ Area inC , then loc(B) ∈⋃
k′∈S′ G
U
B(k
′). Let j′ be such that loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′). Since, by defini-
tion of granularity, granules of the same granularity do not overlap, from
loc(B) ∈ ⋃k′∈S′ GUB(k′) and loc(B) ∈ GUB(j′) it follows that j′ ∈ S′. Since,
by Lemma 4, the two-parties protocol computes the set inclusion between
j′ and S′, A computes that B is in proximity if and only if j′ ∈ S′. Hence,
since j′ ∈ S′, then A can compute that B is in proximity as the result of the
two-parties protocol.
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A.6 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. During each execution of the Hide&Crypt protocol the SP does not
receive any additional information with respect to the execution of the SP-
Filtering protocol. Hence, from Theorem 1, it follows that there exists at
least one granule of GSPC such that the SP is not able to exclude any location
of that granule as possible location of C. We now prove that, for each buddy
D, there exists at least one granule of GUC such that D is not able to exclude
any location of that granule as possible location of C.
By assumption, D has no information about the location of C other than
the one exchanged during the protocol. From Proposition 1 and Proposi-
tion 3, it follows that, while executing the Hide&Crypt protocol, D can
restrict the location of C to:
(a) Area inF , when D receives the message“C is in proximity” from the SP;
(b) AreaoutF when D receives the message “C is not in proximity” from the
SP;
(c) AreaNoFilter when D receives the message “C is possibly in proximity”
from the SP;
(d) Area inC when D can compute that C is in proximity as the result of the
two-parties computation;
(e) AreaoutC when D can compute that C is not in proximity as the result of
the two-parties computation;
(f) AreaPassiveC when D receives the message “starting two-parties protocol”
from C.
Given i′ such that loc(C) ∈ GUC(i′), we prove that, for each of these cases,
D is not able to exclude any location of GUC(i
′) as possible location of C.
For cases (a), (b) and (c), thesis follows from Proposition 1. For case
(d), (e) and (f), the proof is analogous to the one of Theorem 2.
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A.7 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The sought after independence intuitively means that whether an
update/request is sent to SP by a user A is not related to where the user is
located. Formally, by the definition of conditional probability, we have
P (ur(A)|locA, priA)
= P (ur(A), locA|priA)/P (locA|priA)
= (P (ur(A)|priA) ∗ P (locA|priA))/P (locA|priA)
= P (ur(A)|priA).
The second equality is due to the protocol, in which an update/request is
sent at fixed time intervals for each user independent of the user’s location.
Hence, the lemma follows.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. All we need is
P (M1|M2, locA, priA) = P (M1|locA, priA),
i.e., the knowledge of the messages in M2 does not have any impact on
the probability of messages in M1. But this follows the perfect secrecy
assumption and the use of keystreams in our protocol.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that for each set M of messages
exchanged during the protocol, we have P (postA) = P (priA). That is, the
messages M do not change the SP ’s knowledge of A’s location. By assump-
tion of the theorem, P (postA) = P (locA|M, priA) as the only knowledge is
M and priA. The knowledge that locA ∈ gA is useless as we assume in this
case that gA is the whole spatial domain. By the definition of conditional
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probability, we have
P (locA|M, priA) =
P (M |locA, priA) ∗ P (locA|priA)/P (M |priA).
It now suffices to show
P (M |locA, priA) = P (M |priA). (A.1)
Intuitively, Equation A.1 says that the messages M are independent of the
location of A. This follows from two observations: the first is that the
issuance of messages does not depend on the location of A by Lemma 1 and
the second is that the (encrypted) messages are independent of the content
of the messages by Lemma 2. More formally, assume
M = m1, . . . ,mn.
Let ur(M) be the messages of the form
ur(m1), . . . , ur(mn),
where ur(mi) is “an update/request is sent by user Bi”. That is, ur(mi)
disregards the encrypted part of the message but only says that a message
is sent and by whom. By perfect secrecy assumption, the probability of a
particular (single) message is the same as any other (single) message that
differs only in the encrypted part, and hence the same as the probability of
ur(mi). Consider the case of two messages in M , i.e., n = 2. Now we have:
P (M |locA, priA)
= P (m1,m2|locA, priA)
= P (m1|m2, locA, priA) ∗ P (m2|locA, priA)
= P (m1|locA, priA) ∗ P (m2|locA, priA) by Lemma 2
= P (ur(m1)|locA, priA) ∗ P (ur(m2)|locA, priA)
by the above discussion
= P (ur(m1), ur(m2)|locA, priA) by Lemma 2
= P (ur(M)|locA, priA)
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The above can be extended to nmessages inM and also to show the equation
P (M |priA) = P (ur(M)|priA). Hence,
P (M |locA, priA)
= P (ur(M)|locA, priA)
= P (ur(M)|priA) by Lemma 1
= P (M |priA)
and the thesis is established.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Given a buddy B, we prove the theorem by showing that for each set
M of messages exchanged during the protocol, we have
P (locA|M, priA, locA ∈ gA) = P (locA|priA, locA ∈ gA),
where A is another user, and gA is the location information that is encrypted
in the messages of A with the key shared between A and B. In other words,
we want to show that B will not acquire more location information about
A through the messages other than what B already knows. Intuitively, this
is true since the location information revealed by A is only at the granule
level, but not where within the granule.
The formal proof is the same as for Theorem 4 but with the following
two changes: (1) ur(m) represents that request was sent from the granule
included in the message if the message is intended to B; otherwise, it is the
same as before. (2) locA ∈ gA is included in priA, or equivalently we replace
each occurrence of priA with “locA ∈ gA, priA”. Let us now examine the
steps in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 1 still holds since updates/requests are sent regardless of loca-
tions if the user who sent the message is C 6= A. If C = A, then the ur(A)
gives the location (the granule) where the message is sent. In this case, the
location is totally dependent on the given information of locA, locA ∈ gA
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and priA. Note that l is an index of a granule, any information contained
in locA and priA below the granule level is not relevant to the probability
of a message.
For Lemma 2, the content in M2 still does not have any impact on the
content in M1 even when B can decrypt the messages intended to him as
there is no information (from priA, locA, and locA ∈ gA) that restricts any
possible content in M1, so the conditional probability of M1 does not change
regardless the existence of M2.
For the discussion regarding the probability of mi and ur(mi), with the
addition of locA ∈ gA, we still have that the conditional probability of mi
being the same as that of ur(mi). Indeed, assume
mi = 〈C, ui, EKui(l)〉.
If C 6= A, then all messages of the type have the same probability with
or without knowing A’s location since C’s location information is not as-
sumed in the conditional probability. This case is exactly the same as for
the SP and the conditional probability of mi is the same as that of ur(mi).
If C = A, since B can decrypt the message, hence knowing the location l
in the message, this location l (an index value of a granule in GUA) needs
to be consistent with the location knowledge in locA and priA: if it is not
consistent, then the probability of the message is zero; otherwise, the prob-
ability is totally dependent on the probability of A being in GUA(l) given
locA, locA ∈ gA, and priA. But the same can be said about ur(mi) (which
says that a message was sent at the given location), i.e., the probability of
ur(mi) depends totally on locA, locA ∈ gA, and priA. Therefore, mi and
ur(mi) have the same conditional probability. By the same reasoning as in
the proof of Theorem 4, ur(M) has the same conditional probability as M .
With all the above discussions, the theorem is established.
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A.11 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. The proof follows the same style of that for Theorem 4. That is, we
show P (M |locA, priA) = P (M |priA), i.e., the location of A does not change
the probability of messages M conditioned on priA. Like for Theorem 5, we
examine the proof steps of Theorem 4 for the purpose of the current thesis.
Lemmas 1 and 2 both hold due to the use of hashing function that displays
stronger secrecy than encryption. The important difference is the discussion
of the conditional probabilities of m and ur(m). If m is an update, then the
same applies as in the proof of Theorem 4. The difference is when m is a
proximity request. In this case, the message contains multiple components.
The critical step is to show that all such messages have the same conditional
probability (to the SP) and hence the same as the conditional probability of
ur(m). This is not difficult since the location information in the condition
is opaque to the SP. This opaqueness is given by two facts. The first is
that the number of components in the message is the same regardless of the
location information. The second is that the indexes of the granules and
the “padding” (S′′ in the protocol) in the message components are hashed
and hence to the SP all possible granule indexes are equally possible in the
encrypted (byK1 in the protocol) message. (Here, hashing before encryption
with K1 is important as the adversary cannot attack using known pattern of
the plaintext.) The above observations lead to the thesis of this theorem.
A.12 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Intuitively, to the buddies, the C-Hide&Hash is much stronger than
C-Hide&Seek since buddies only share a hashing function and the buddies
location information is encrypted by a random key (generated by the SP)
before sending to the requesting user B. Formally, the proof follows the
same style as that for Theorem 5. The only difference is what it means
when a message is “consistent” with the location knowledge. In this case,
from B’s perspective, we need to define ur(m) to be the binary random
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variable that “the user is in one of the requesting granules or not” for the
message sent back from the SP (as the reply to a proximity request from B).
After B requesting proximity, B will receive a message from the SP with the
encrypted hash value of A’s location (in addition to the “kick back” from the
SP in the form of encrypted values that B sent to the SP). Even though B
and A shares the hash function, B does not know the encryption key which
is randomly generated by the SP (K2 in the protocol). Therefore, this value
is probabilistically independent of the location of A. In this case, based on
the protocol, the only information B obtains is whether A is in a granule
among the ones given by B. This needs to be consistent with the location
information contained in locA and priA. If not, then the probability of this
message is zero, and otherwise the probability is totally dependent on locA
and priA as no other information is available. The thesis follows the above
discussions in the same style as the proof of Theorem 5.
Appendix B
Notation
A summary of the notation used in this dissertation follows:
• locA – the original (exact) location of a user A
• δA – the proximity threshold requested by A i.e. the minimum distance
required to consider another user being in proximity
• R – the minimum uncertainty region (MUR) in which a user does not
want an adversary to exclude any of the points as possible location
• M – the set of exchanged messages
• GSPA – the spatial granularity selected by a user A as privacy prefer-
ence, with respect to the service provider
• GUA – the spatial granularity selected by a user A as privacy preference,
with respect to the other users
• GrUA – the grid-based spatial granularity selected by a user A as privacy
preference, with respect to the other users
• LA(i) – given the granule of GSPA with index i, the region given by the
union of granules of GUA intersecting G
SP
A (i)
• EKA – E is a symmetric encryption function, using KA as encryption
key.
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• E∗KA – E∗ is a commutative encryption function, using KA as encryp-
tion key.
• HKA – H is an hashing function, using KA as salt.
• d(locA, locB) – the Euclidean distance between the locations of users
A and B
• priA – random variable denoting the distribution of the location of a
user A. This distribution is known a-priori by the adversary
• postA – random variable denoting the distribution of the location of
a user A. This distribution is computed a-posteriori by the adversary
i.e. after considering the set M
• mindist – the minimum distance between two regions
• maxdist – the maximum distance between two regions
• moddist – the modular distance between two points i.e. the Euclidean
distance computed as if the considered finite spatial domain were “cir-
cular” on both axis
• mmd – the minimum modular distance between two regions
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